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This dissertation contains two essays on the aggressive behavior of corpora-
tions in product market competition. In the first essay, I investigate how market
structure can impact a firm’s risk of facing predation by rivals, and hence, its fi-
nancial policy decisions. Using a simple model, I demonstrate that a firm faces a
greater predation threat when it meets the same competitor in many markets, as
this competitor is able to internalize more of the benefit, degrading the firm’s ability
to compete in the future through aggressive actions today.
I then test the predictions of the model using 2003-2011 panel data on store
location across retail store chains in the US. I find that firms tend to expand more
aggressively in markets shared with a competitor experiencing a substantial increase
in leverage, or a decline in a credit rating, when they face that competitor in more of
the other markets. The expansion relationship was found to be stronger in data from
the 2008-2009 financial crisis, a period when difficulty in rolling over or obtaining
new debt made it especially hard for weak firms to absorb losses. I also show that a
firm facing the same competitors in many markets choose lower levels of leverage and
that it decreases that leverage when a merger in the industry increases the amount
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of competitive overlap it has with other firms. These results suggest that firms are
aware of the predation risk due to a competitive overlap and select financial policies
to minimize this risk.
In the second essay, I study the impact of internally generated funds on prod-
uct market competition. More specifically, I investigate the idea that firms compete
aggressively when their competitors face cash flow shortfalls. Testing this idea is
challenging because competitor’s cash flow changes are potentially endogenous with
respect to firm’s behavior. I address this problem in three ways. First, I investi-
gate firm’s reaction in a given market when its competitors face cash flow shortfalls
outside of that market; this analysis is conducted using store location data on retail
store chains. Second, I focus on the 2008-2009 financial crisis period in which re-
tail store chains were hit by a negative demand shock which was hardly expected ex
ante. Finally, I use a shock to local economic conditions which varies across markets
and the different distributions of store locations across firms as instruments for the
changes in competitors’ cash flows.
I find that a firm expands more in a given market in which it competes with
rivals which face a more negative cash flow shortfall in the other markets. This
relation is stronger when the competitors were highly leveraged before the crisis.
Finally, I illustrate evidence that a firm responds more aggressively to competitor’s
cash flow shortfalls if it competes with that competitor in many of the same markets;
this result is consistent with the prediction of the model in Chapter 1. These essays
contribute to the literature by adding new evidence on the predatory behavior of
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Chapter 1
Competitive Overlap and Predatory Behavior
1.1 Introduction
Researchers have investigated the tendency of firms to “predate upon” finan-
cially weak competitors; these studies began with the work of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1986) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). A firm facing a vulnerable competitor
has an incentive to behave aggressively to deny the competitor the cash flow that
it needs to compete effectively in the future and possibly to drive it out of business
completely. Examples of such aggressive behavior include starting price wars, ex-
panding into locations that are in close proximity to competitors’ existing locations,
and ramping up advertising.
The evidence suggests that firms prey on financially vulnerable peers. For
instance, Chevalier (1995a,b) finds that; when a grocery store chain experiences a
large increase in debt due to a leveraged buyout (LBO), its competitors enter or
expand into the chain’s local markets. In addition, prices fall in markets where
low-leveraged rivals are competing with an LBO chain; these results are consistent
with rival chains lowering prices in an effort to induce the LBO chain to exit the
market.
However, it is unlikely that all highly-leveraged firms face predation. Previ-
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ous studies offer little guidance on the conditions under which the threat of predation
is high and the threat should therefore be a first order concern in the choice of fi-
nancial policy. This chapter attempts to fill the gap in two steps. First, I show, in
a two-period Cournot model with financial distress, that a firm should behave more
aggressively in the short-run in markets in which it faces a highly-leveraged rival if
it also faces that rival in many other markets. Intuitively, such a firm can capture
more of the future monopoly rents from driving its peers into financial distress.
Therefore, a firm meeting the same competitors in many markets faces a greater
risk of predation.
I then test the model’s predictions using 2003-2011 panel data on store lo-
cation and local advertising in five retail industries. Consistent with the model’s
predictions, I find that when a firm experiences a substantial increase in leverage,
competitors expand more into each of its markets if they meet the firm in more
markets. I address concerns that some omitted variables may drive this relation-
ship in several ways. I also find that firms choose a lower leverage when they face
the same competitors in many markets, suggesting that firms take predation risk
into account in setting the financial policies. My results contribute to the literature
on capital structure and product market competition by identifying circumstances
under which the interaction of the two can have a big impact on firm behavior.
I begin by collecting data on the location of stores in the grocery store, dis-
count store, department store, pharmacy, and wholesale club industries. I focus on
these industries for two reasons. First, firms in these industries typically operate
across many local markets, with substantial variation in the competitive overlap
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between firms. Second, they sell relatively undifferentiated products with low mar-
gins. This makes the profitability vulnerable to aggressive behavior that increases
the competitive pressure in the short-run.
Using store-level location and sales data, I construct pairwise “multimarket
contact” measures that capture the degree of competitive overlap between two firms
across all of the markets in which the firms compete. These measures of multimarket
contact are adopted from the industrial organization literature (e.g., Feinberg (1985),
Singal (1996), Chen (1996), and Gimeno and Jeong (2001)). I then identify the firm
in each market experiencing the largest increase in leverage during the past year. I
classify that firm as financially weak if its increase in leverage is in the top quartile
in its industry. I then test whether competitors in a market with a weak firm
are more likely to expand (i.e., add new stores) in that market if they have more
contact with the weak firm in other markets. I include industry-market-year fixed
effects in my regressions. Thus, I rely solely on variation in competitive overlap
within an industry-market-year in conducting this test. This allows me to rule out
the possibility that the estimates from the test are contaminated by the effects of
variation in competition across markets and industries or in the aggregate over time,
as well as the effects of variation within a market and industry over time.1
I find that firms having more multimarket contact with a financially weak
competitor in a market are more likely to expand into that market than those with
less multimarket contact. A one-standard deviation increase in multimarket contact
1 For example, firms expanding business may open stores in many of the growing markets; this
may affect both the competitive overlap among these firms and the financial structure.
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with a weak firm leads to an economically meaningful rise in the probability of
expansion by 2.52% in the following year. The relationship also holds when I define
a financially weak firm as one experiencing a drop in a credit rating from investment
to non-investment grade. This is consistent with the predictions of my model.
One natural concern with these results is that leverage and multimarket
contact are both choice variables, and therefore, potentially endogenous with respect
to expansion decisions, even after accounting for industry-market-year fixed effects.
For example, a weak firm may raise leverage ex ante to show its pre-commitment to
competitors that it has a high degree of multimarket contact with, if it expects the
competitors to expand aggressively.2
I address this concern in three ways. First, I test whether the relationship
between multimarket contact and expansion holds when the firm with the largest
increase in leverage in a market is not financially weak. If my results are driven by
omitted factors affecting both multimarket contact and expansion, but not affecting
leverage, then I should find a similar relationship even when there is no financially
weak firm in the market. I do not find that this is the case.
Second, I perform a placebo test using artificially constructed markets of
firms not competing directly with each other. More specifically, I examine the
relationship between a firm’s expansion in a market and its multimarket contact
with a financially weak competitor in that market, but from another industry. If
multimarket contact with a financially weak firm causes expansion, then I should
2Brander and Lewis (1986) argue that a manager has limited liability, debt effectively commits
the firm to more aggressive behavior.
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not find such a relationship in these artificial markets. I find no such relationship.
Third, I use the recent financial crisis as a plausibly exogenous shock to a
financially weak firm’s ability to withstand predatory behavior by its rivals. During
the crisis, firms faced difficulty rolling over existing debt and obtaining additional
financing. This made it difficult for an already highly-leveraged firm to endure losses
without failing. Thus, incentives to predate upon weak rivals were likely to be espe-
cially strong during this time period. Providing further evidence that multimarket
contact drives predatory behavior, I find that firms having high multimarket contact
with a financially weak competitor expanded in the weak firm’s local markets more
aggressively during the crisis than in other periods.
While I focus on expansion as an aggressive action, firms may also compete
aggressively in other ways, for example by dropping price or increasing advertising.
I also use market-level advertising data from Ad Spender to examine whether a
firm increase advertising in a market with a financially weak competitor when it
faces that competitor in many markets. Here the results are less clear. Multimarket
contact with a weak firm in a market is positively related to advertising in that
market. However, I cannot reject the hypothesis that this relation and the relation
in cases where the firm experiencing the largest leverage increase is not financially
weak are different.
This might reflect an inherent limitation of local advertising data, as it does
not capture any effects on a firm’s regional or national advertising, which might
be a more cost effective means of damaging a weak competitor with which the
firm competes in a lot of markets. However, it might also reflect a disadvantage
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of advertising as a means of predation. Unlike expansion decisions, an increase in
a firm’s advertising budget is an easy decision to later reverse. Thus, advertising
represents less of a commitment to aggressive competition. Moreover, expanding
while the weak firm is still present may be more useful, because it preempts the
entry of other competitors if the weak firm is later eliminated from the market.
Finally, I examine the relationship between capital structure decisions and
the degree of multimarket contact a firm has with competitors across all markets in
which it competes. My model and the results, thus far, suggest that a firm faces a
greater risk of predation when it faces the same competitors in many markets (as
opposed to mostly different competitors in different markets). If the threat of being
predated upon is a meaningful cost of taking on leverage, then firms should adopt
more conservative financial policies when they have more multimarket contact with
the competitors.
Consistent with firms considering the threat of predation in choosing lever-
age, I find that a firm’s leverage is lower when the average level of multimarket
contact that it has with all of its competitors is higher. To further identify the
effect of the threat of predation on leverage, I examine the effects of changes in mul-
timarket contact due to mergers. A merger between two firms increases the average
amount of multimarket contact that its competitors face. However, this effect can
be either small or large, depending on how much an overlap a firm had with each
of the two firms separately before the merger. I find that the change in a firm’s
leverage is negatively related to the magnitude of the multimarket contact changes
caused by the mergers of its rival. This result further supports the argument that
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firms do adjust the financial leverage to take into account the threat of predation.
This chapter builds on the literature investigating the relationship between
firms’ financial condition and product market competition in retail industries. Cheva-
lier (1995a,b) shows that, when a grocery store chain becomes highly-leveraged as a
result of an LBO, its competitors are more likely to enter or expand into the LBO
firm’s local markets, and prices fall in markets in which low-leveraged rivals com-
pete with an LBO firm, suggesting that the rival lowers prices to induce the LBO
firms to exit. Similarly, Khanna and Tice (2005) document that high-debt firms
are more likely to exit cities with lower prices during recessions. However, there
is an alternative explanation for the results in these papers that is difficult to rule
out. More specifically, being highly leveraged may force a firm to scale back. As
a result, its competitors may expand to fill the resulting vacuum. In addition, a
highly-leveraged firm might cut prices to steal market share and increase short-run
cash flow.3
The primary innovation of this chapter is to consider how often a highly-
leveraged firm meets the same rival in different markets rather than treat the same
firm operating in different markets as different firms, as previous papers have. This
allows me to more cleanly identify the effects of incentives to predate on the aggres-
siveness of the firm with respect to its competitors. More importantly, it enables
me to study which types of firms engage in predation, and which financially weak
firms are most subject to predation. This chapter also contributes to the literature
3Many have argued the opposite, as a highly-leveraged firm might sacrifice the future market
share for higher prices today to increase the short-run cash flow.
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by illustrating that the threat of predation feeds back into a firm’s capital structure
decisions.
This chapter contributes to the literature considering how financial policy
and product market competition interact to affect firms’ behavior. Previous studies
have documented that the investment, sales, or equity values of highly-leveraged
firms decline more in more concentrated industries. However, it is not clear what
drives these differences; they may be driven by consumers’ reluctance to buy prod-
ucts from a firm with a higher bankruptcy probability (Opler and Titman (1994))
or by a higher level of managerial discipline (Kovenock and Phillips (1997)). I show
that a firm’s competitive environment can interact with its financial condition to
influence both its own and competitors’ behavior due to its impact on incentives to
engage in predation.
Finally, my study adds to the industrial organization literature on multimar-
ket contact. Previous studies have focused on the tendency of multimarket contact
to promote “mutual forbearance,” a form of implicit collusion. A firm competing
with the same firms in multiple markets avoids competing aggressively in one mar-
ket, for example by lowering prices, because of the threat of retaliation in the other
markets in which it competes with the same firms (Edwards (1955); Scott (1982);
Bernheim and Whinston (1990); Phillips and Mason (1992)). In contrast, this chap-
ter illustrates that multimarket contact can lead to more aggressive behavior, as
a firm internalizes more of the benefits of eliminating a competitor when it shares
more markets in common with that competitor.
The organization of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Section II describes
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the model, Section III introduces the data and the measures of competitive overlap,
Section IV presents the empirical evidence, and Section V concludes.
1.2 Model
Figure 1.1: Competitive overlap
Consider a two-period Cournot model of duopoly competition with firms
selling a homogeneous good in each of two separate markets, Market 1 and Market
2. I consider two separate cases. In Case 1, there are three firms, A, B and C.
Firms A and B compete against each other in Market 1, while Firms A and C
compete against each other in Market 2. In Case 2, there are only two firms, A and
B, and they compete against each other in both markets. The firms in the model
may participate in other markets outside the model, but Firm A does not compete
with either Firm B or Firm C in any other market. In each period, the inverse
demand function for market j = 1, 2 is pj = a−Qj , where Qj is the total quantity
produced by the two firms competing in market j. Note that demand in the model
is deterministic. For simplicity, production is costless.
Firm A begins the game with a level of debt D ≥ 0, which is due at the end of
period 1. At the beginning of the first period, firms simultaneously choose quantities
9
to sell in the period in each market in which they compete. A firm competing in
more than one market can choose different quantities in each market. Let qij denote
firm i’s first period quantity choice in market j. Then the quantity choices in Case 1
are {qA1, qA2, qB1, qC2} and in Case 2 are {qA1, qA2, qB1, qB2}. Thus, Q1 = qA1 + qB1
in both cases, while Q2 = qA2 + qC2 in Case 1 and Q2 = qA2 + qB2 in Case 2.
At the end of the first period, firms compete and realize their cash flows. In
addition, Firm A receives a random cash flow z, which is uniformly distributed over
[0, z], from an outside source. This source might be other markets in which it sells
but does not compete with other firms in the model, or it might be from some other
line of business entirely. This is a simple way of introducing uncertainty into Firm
A’s first period cash flow. Firm A then repays its debt, D, if it has sufficient cash
flow to do so. If it does, then Firm A continues to operate in the second period. If
not, creditors receive all of Firm A’s cash, and Firm A ceases to operate completely
(i.e., in both markets).
In the second period, all firms remaining in the model simultaneously choose
quantities to sell in each market in which they compete and realize the second period
cash flows. If Firm A was able to repay its debt at the end of the first period, there
is duopoly competition in both markets in the second period. It can easily be shown
that the equilibrium duopoly profit in the second period for each firm in each market
in this case is a29 . If Firm A was not able to repay its debt at the end of the first
period, then the other firm competing in each of the markets has a monopoly in that
market in the second period. It can easily be shown that the equilibrium monopoly
profit in the second period for each market is a24 . Note that I do not allow Firm B
10
Figure 1.2: Time line
to enter Market 2 or Firm C to enter Market 1 in the second period. This holds
fixed the number of competitors in each market in the second period when Firm A
exists. It captures the idea that expanding into a new market at a minimum requires
time and planning, and some firms may be poorly-positioned to compete in certain
markets.
I can now consider the equilibrium choice of quantities in period 1. Firms
A, B, and C solve the following maximization problems:
(Case 1)
maxqA1,qA2 πA = (a− qA1 − qB1)qA1 + (a− qA2 − qC2)qA2 + E[z]
+Prob[z + (a− qA1 − qB1)qA1 + (a− qA2 − qC2)qA2 ≥ D] 2a
2
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maxqB1 πB = (a− qA1 − qB1)qB1 + Prob[z + (a− qA1 − qB1)qA1
+(a− qA2 − qC2)qA2 < D] a
2
4 + Prob[z + (a− qA1 − qB1)qA1
+(a− qA2 − qC2)qA2 ≥ D] a
2
9
maxqC2 πC = (a− qA2 − qC2)qC2 + Prob[z + (a− qA1 − qB1)qA1
+(a− qA2 − qC2)qA2 < D] a
2
4 + Prob[z + (a− qA1 − qB1)qA1
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maxqB1,qB2 πB = (a− qA1 − qB1)qB1 + (a− qA2 − qB2)qB2
+Prob[z + (a− qA1 − qB1)qA1 + (a− qA2 − qB2)qA2 < D] a
2
2
+Prob[z + (a− qA1 − qB1)qA1 + (a− qA2 − qB2)qA2 ≥ D] 2a
2
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Any firm competing with firm A has an incentive to produce a large quantity
in the first period in order to increase the likelihood that Firm A generates cash
flow less than D, allowing its competitors to earn monopoly profits in the second
period. The key insight from examining the payoff functions is that, in Case 1,
Firms B and C each enjoy the monopoly profits in only a single market. Thus,
each only internalizes the benefits of eliminating Firm A from the one market in
which it competes. In Case 2, on the other hand, Firm B receives the monopoly
profits in both markets, and thus, internalizes all of the benefits of eliminating Firm
A. Thus, Firm B has a stronger incentive to predate upon Firm A by choosing
higher quantities in the first period in the second case, than either Firm B or C
has individually in the first case. This can be seen in the equilibrium first period

































Figure 1.3 illustrates the equilibrium in Cases 1 and Case 2. When Firm
B competes with Firm A in two markets, it sells more in each than when it meets
Firm A in one market, implying that Firm B’s aggressiveness against its weak rival,
Firm A, increases in their competitive overlap. It is also worth noting that Firm A
12
Figure 1.3: Production choices depending on competitive overlap
sells less when it has a high degree of competitive overlap with Firm B. However,
the prediction of the model on which I focus in the rest of this chapter is that a
competitor with more multimarket contact with a financially weak rival is more
likely to be aggressive than a competitor with less multimarket contact with the
rival.
1.3 Data and Measures
1.3.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction
To test the predictions of the model, I focus on five retail industries: grocery
stores, wholesale clubs, department stores, discount stores, and pharmacies.4 These
industries offer several advantages for studying competition among firms. In these
industries, firms are less likely to compete by differentiating products than other
retail industries, as they sell many of the same products and face fairly similar de-
4SIC codes for grocery stores, wholesale clubs, department stores, discount stores, and pharma-
cies are 541105, 531110, 531102, 591205, and 573117, respectively.
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mand changes over time.5 Rather, they tend to compete with the rivals by reducing
prices, opening more stores near the competitors’ stores, or advertising more.
The data in this chapter comes primarily from two sources: Reference USA
and Ad Spender. Reference USA is a database that contains detailed information on
almost every retailer in the US at the establishment level. It consists of snapshots of
detailed store information, such as store name, address, phone number, sales volume,
the number of employees, parent company information, industry classification, and
the population in which the store is located (at the 5 digit zip code level). I obtain
snapshots of this information at the end of the 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 for
all stores in each industry with at least 100 employees.6
I cleaned the data, making store names and parent firm names consistent;
then I eliminated multiple store observations for the same parent firm at a given
address in the same year. I manually matched parent firms to stores using the
Corporate Affiliations database when information was missing from the Reference
USA data, or if stores with the same name showed different parent firm names in
the same year.7 If the records of a store were dropped from the database in certain
years and then reappeared in later years, I filled in the missing records. Overall,
5To some extent, there is product differentiation in these industries. For example, many grocery
stores sell private label products (those manufactured or provided by a manufacturer for offer under
a retailer’s brand), and some department stores may sell products from more luxurious brands than
others.
6My sample is biased towards large stores; the number of observations is unbalanced across the
different industries. For example, I have fewer observations in the pharmacy industry than in the
other four industries because individual pharmacies tend to have fewer employees.
7In some cases, stores with the same name are owned by different parent firms in different regions
due to store-level buyouts.
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there were 87,542 distinct store-level records for 1,551 firms.8 Table 1.1 illustrates
that public firms tend to own more stores than private firms. The relatively large
change in the number of private company-owned stores in the discount department
store industry after 2003 is due to Kmart, which was privately owned in 2003 and
went public in the subsequent year. The number of all stores increased the most in
2007, while it decreased in 2009 and 2011, following the onset of the financial crisis.
Ad Spender provides dollar amounts of firms’ advertisement spending at
the firm-designated market area-product category-advertising medium level. The
designated market area (DMA) is the region in which a population generally receives
the same media offerings. In urban areas, the size of one DMA is similar to the
size of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA).9 It covers various media, such as
television (cable television, network television, spot television, and syndication),
print (consumer magazines, national newspapers, local newspapers, and Sunday
magazines), radio (national spot radio and network radio) and outdoor advertising,
such as billboards. I obtain monthly advertisement spending data for the years of
2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011, for all five retail industries in my sample.
I construct advertising spending variables at the firm-DMA-year level by
summing up monthly spending in advertisement across the different product cate-
gories and across the different advertising media. I merge store location data with
advertisement spending data by assigning a DMA code to each 5-digit zip code, re-
8These missing records may be partly due to the screening rule of 100 employees. That is, a
store may be dropped from the sample because its employee headcount falls below 100, but it will
reappear if its headcount exceeds 100 in the future.
9DMA was invented by Nielsen Media Research. It basically identifies TV stations that best
reach an area; there are 210 Nielsen DMAs in the US.
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sulting in 75,106 store-level records and 15,285 distinct firm-DMA level records from
1,177 firms. Table 1.2 presents the summary statistics of advertisement spending
by media types in each industry. Department stores and discount stores tend to
spend more on advertisement, when compared to the others, and department stores
advertise more in the local media, while discount stores advertise more nationwide.
Grocery stores and pharmacies tend to spend less on advertising, but more firms in
the grocery store industry engage in advertisements. This is partly because grocery
store chains are more likely to operate within specific regions, and therefore, choose
cheaper forms of advertisement covering only the local areas.
My store location and advertising data covers both public and private firms.
To measure the financial characteristics of firms in my sample, I merge this data
with Compustat’s Fundamental and Standard & Poor’s Credit Ratings. Note that
this data is only available for public firms. Table 1.3 reports the summary statis-
tics of these variables. Book Leverage is measured as book debt over total assets,
Market Leverage is book debt over market value, Sales is sales in logs, Profitability
is operating income before depreciation divided by total assets, Market to Book is
the market-to-book ratio defined as the market value over total assets, Tangibility
is property, plant and equipment (PPE) divided by total assets, and Average Stock
Return is defined as the firm’s annual stock return over the past three years.
1.3.2 Definition of Local Markets and Aggressiveness Measures
In order to measure the degree of competitive overlap, measured as the
geographic market overlap in this chapter, I need to define a local market. Ideally,
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the local market should be small enough for stores in the market to be in direct
competition with each other and targeting the same consumers. At the same time,
it needs to be large enough for consumers not to shop in adjacent local markets.
I define a local market at the level of the first three digits of the five-digit
zip codes following Khanna and Tice (2005). They suggest that the area covered by
a three-digit zip code appears to be a population center and retail stores tend to be
clustered around such centers. The size of this area is smaller than the size of the
metropolitan statistical area (MSA).10 In my sample, there are 833, 835, 841, 830,
and 829 different local markets from 2003 to 2011, biennially, and four stores that
compete with each other in a market-industry, on average.
I measure firms’ aggressive behavior in a given market in two ways: ex-
pansion (store opening) and the amount of advertisement spending in that market.
Price competition is not explored in this chapter because it is difficult to collect firms’
market-level pricing data.11 Nevertheless, we may not lose much of the aspect of
competition because advertisements in such industries as grocery stores, discount
stores, and department stores, are often about discounts or sales. Moreover, firms
in these industries may prefer expansion over price competition, because expansion
may preempt the entry of other competitors after the weak firm is eliminated from
10Some studies define a local market at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level. This may
coincide better with identifiable physical features, such as population, rather than ZIP Codes, but
is too big to ensure that stores in this area compete directly with each other.
11While some previous studies have investigated price competition using city-level price index
or scanner data, they are very limited. A city-level price index hardly provides us with enough
information on which firm triggers the price changes; scanner data is only available for a few firms




Expansion is defined if a new store appears in Reference USA that was
not present in the previous year.12 Advertisement spending is the dollar amount of
annual spending on advertisements. Note that firm’s aggressive behavior is measured
at the firm level, not at the subsidiary level, meaning that I do not distinguish
between the different subsidiaries owned by the same parent firm if they are in the
same industry. For example, the stores of Marshalls and T. J. Maxx are treated as
belonging to a single firm, as both are owned by the TJX Companies, Inc.
1.3.3 Competitive Overlap Measure
To measure competitive overlap, I employ the measure of multimarket con-
tact from the industrial organization literature. Although various measures of mul-
timarket contact have been used in the literature, multimarket contact measures
primarily capture whether firms are competing in the same markets and the degree
of the market overlap. I construct two multimarket contact measures at the pair-
wise level.13 They are very similar to the measure of Chen (1996), who captured
the overall degree of multimarket contact between two firms across all the markets
in which both firms were competing.14
12Although the data obtained from Reference USA is biennial (2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011),
it provides the date records are added, which makes it possible to pin down the year of the new
entry.
13Other studies have also used firm-in-market level or market-level measures. See Gimeno and
Jeong (2001) for more details.
14The only difference is that I use the dollar amount of sales or the number of stores in each
market to calculate market shares, while Chen (1996) uses the number of customers to calculate
market shares. My measures are also similar to the measure used by Baum and Korn (1999).
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In constructing multimarket contact measures, I account for the size of the
competing firms, because competing with a firm in one additional market would be
less significant for a firm that operates across ten markets than a firm that operates
in only one market. Similarly, I account for the total number of competing firms in
a given market, because the impact of one competitor in a market with ten other
competitors would be less important than its impact in a market with only two
competitors.
I construct two measures: a count-based measure and a sales-based measure.
The count-based measure provides the same weight to the contact of a pair of firms
across different markets, while the sales-based measure gives more weight to the












where: Iim (Ijm) is an indicator function with a value of 1 if firm i (firm j) operates
in market m, Ni is the total number of markets where firm i is operating, and





kεKm Ikm where Km is the set of all firms competing in market m). In the
example in Figure 1, MMCCAB = MMCCBA = 14 in Case 1 and MMCCAB =
MMCCBA = 12 in Case 2, meaning Firm A and Firm B have a higher degree of
competitive overlap in Case 2.
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where: sim (sjm) is sales of firm i (firm j) in market m, Si is firm i’s total sales
across all markets, and Sm is the sum of the sales of all firms in market m (i.e.,
Si =
∑
m sim and Sm =
∑
kεKm Skm where Km is the set of all firms competing in
market m). This measure consists of two components: the importance for firm i
of each market shared with its competitor firm j, and the competitor j’s market
position in these markets. Because it takes into account the size of the competitor
positions in a market, this measure may better reflect the degree of competition
between them than the count-based measure.
One feature of these measures is that they are normalized by firm i’s total
sales or the total number of markets in which a firm operates. Thus, it captures the
relative competitive market overlap with other firms from the perspective of firm i.
This ensures that my estimation results are not contaminated by a big firm effect.
That is, without the normalization, the degree of multimarket contact is higher for
large firms, and they tend to expand more and spend more in advertisements, which
could result in a positive relationship between multimarket contact and expansion
or advertisement spending.
Table 1.5 reports an example of the calculated multimarket contact measures
for similar sized firms in the grocery store industry. Both A&P and Giant Foods
operate primarily in the northeast, while Safeway has stores in a few of the same
markets as A&P and Giant Foods, but primarily operates in the western US. Thus,
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the competitive overlap between Giant Foods and A&P should be larger than the
overlap between Safeway and A&P. The multimarket measure between Giant Foods
and A&P is about ten times bigger than the measure for Safeway and A&P
Table 1.4 reports the summary statistics of my multimarket contact mea-
sures. The multimarket contact measures are calculated for a pair of firms within
an industry and within a year. Firms in the discount store industry and the grocery
store industry tend to have a higher degree of multimarket contact, when compared
to other industries, which indicates that firms in these industries tend to operate in
many of the same markets with each other. The low level of multimarket contact
for firms in the pharmacy industry is due to the exclusion of stores with fewer than
100 employees. Note that in my analysis, I rely only on variation in multimarket
contact within the industry and not across industries.
1.4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I test whether a firm is more likely to compete aggressively
in a market which it shares with a financially weak competitor if it meets that
competitor in more markets. I focus on aggression through expansion decisions,
but I also consider aggressive advertising. I then examine whether a firm facing a
greater threat of predation because it overlaps with the same competitors in many
markets chooses a more conservative capital structure, in response.
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1.4.1 Effect of Competitive Overlap on the Predation of Financially
Weak Rivals
1.4.1.1 Expansion Following a Rival’s Leverage Changes
I test the hypothesis that a firm facing a financially weak competitor in a
market behaves more aggressively with respect to that competitor if it also faces the
competitor in many other markets. I begin by identifying the firm in each market
experiencing the largest increase in leverage in the past year. I classify this firm as
financially weak if its leverage increase is in the top quartile of its industry. I then
estimate probit models in which the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one
if a firm expands in a local market in a given year and zero otherwise. The primary
explanatory variable of interest is the firm’s multimarket contact with respect to
the competitor experiencing the largest increase in leverage. Table 1.6 shows the
results.
In all of these regressions, I control for industry-market-year fixed effects.15
Thus, I am effectively studying whether, among the firms competing in a market
during a year, those with more multimarket contact with the firm experiencing the
largest leverage increase expand more, or less, than those with less multimarket
contact. Because I am relying on variation only within industry-market-year, my
estimates are not contaminated by the effects of unobserved cross-industry or cross-
15I apply the Mundlak approach to avoid the incidental parameters problem that can arise
in non-linear models with fixed effects when the number of observations is fixed within a group
(see Wooldridge (2002) and Mundlak (1978) for more details). This approach effectively assumes
that the unobserved heterogeneity at the market-industry-year level is correlated with the market-
industry-year group means of the regressors. My results are similar if I instead use a linear proba-
bility model with fixed effects (See Table 1.13) or a conditional logit model.
22
market factors that might drive expansion independently of multimarket contact,
even if these unobserved factors are time varying. In my regressions, I also control for
the market share (Market Share), market dependence (Market Dependence), and size
(Total Sales) of the firm whose expansion decisions I am estimating. Market Share
is the fraction of the firm’s sales divided by the sum of sales of all firms operating
in a given market. Market Dependence is the firm’s sales in a given market divided
by its sum of sales across all markets. Total sales is the natural log of the firm’s
total sales.16
Panel A of Table 1.6 reports the average partial effects from the probit
model estimation using the sales-based multimarket contact measure. The capacity
to predate is strongest when the potential prey is in a financially weak state. I
therefore run my regressions separately for cases where the firm experiencing the
largest increase in leverage is financially weak (the first two columns) and where
it isn’t (the last two columns). For each of these two cases, I estimate the model
separately for the expansion decisions of all firms in the group (first and third
columns) and for those of publicly-traded firms only (second and fourth columns).
In the latter case, I also control for a one year-lagged book leverage (i.e., book debt
over total assets) of the firm whose expansion decisions I am estimating.
The first column illustrates that a one-standard deviation increase in a firm’s
multimarket contact with a financially weak competitor is associated with a 2.52%
16The explanatory variables constructed are one-year lagged when the dependent variable is
measured in the even-numbered years (year 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010) and two-year lagged when
the dependent variable is measured in the odd-numbered years (year 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011).
This is because, while store opening information is available every year, store-level sales information
is only available in odd-numbered years.
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rise in the probability that the firm expands in the market in the subsequent year.
The second column shows that this relationship is slightly larger (2.79%) if I estimate
the model examining only the expansion decisions of publicly-traded firms. These
estimates support the hypothesis that firms behave more aggressively in a market
in which they face a financially weak competitor when they face that competitor in
more markets.
The third and fourth columns illustrate that this relationship does not hold
when the firm with the largest increase in leverage does not experience a leverage
increase in the top quartile within its industry (i.e., is not financially weak). This
provides comfort that the relationship, where there is a financially weak firm, is not
driven by unobserved factors correlated with both a firm’s multimarket contact with
other firms in a market and its expansion decisions in that market. If it were, and if
the effects of this unobserved factor did not vary with the presence of a financially
weak firm, then the relationship should hold, regardless of whether the market has
a financially weak firm or not. Consistent with the existing literature, a firm’s
own leverage level has a negative relationship with the probability of its expansion
regardless of whether the firm experiencing the largest leverage increase in a given
market is financially weak or not.17
Panel B shows the results of the same set of regressions in Panel A, using the
count-based multimarket contact measure, instead of the sales-based measure. A
17All of the results for publicly-traded firms are similar when I control for other financial variables,
including total assets (the natural log of the firm’s total book assets), Tobin’s Q (total assets plus
the market value of equity minus the book value of equity divided by total assets), market-to-book
ratios (market value over total assets), and the amount of cash holdings. I do not include these
variables to keep the model parsimonious.
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one-standard deviation increase in a firm’s multimarket contact with a competitor
whose leverage increase is in the top quartile of its industry is associated with a 3.85%
rise in the probability that the firm expands in the market in the subsequent year.
The relationship is again slightly stronger when I examine the expansion decisions of
only publicly-traded firms. When the firm with the largest increase in leverage does
experience a leverage increase in the top quartile in its industry, the relationship
between multimarket contact and expansion is positive for the full sample, but is
relatively weak and is statistically significant at only the 10% level. When I examine
only the expansion decisions of publicly-traded firms, this relationship disappears
completely.
1.4.1.2 Falsification Exercise: Placebo Test
I perform a placebo test to further alleviate the concerns that leverage and
multimarket contact are potentially endogenous with respect to expansion decisions.
More specifically, I examine the relationship between a firm’s expansion in a market
and its multimarket contact with a financially weak firm in the same market, but
from another industry. That is, I construct artificial industry-markets by substitut-
ing in a financially weak firm competing in another industry in the same market. If
the positive relationship between firms’ tendency to expand and the degree of the
multimarket contact with a financially weak competitor is caused by the potential
benefits from predation, then I should not find such a relationship in these artifi-
cial markets, because firms are less likely to have benefits from making a firm from
another industry weaker.
25
I start by identifying the financially weak firms (i.e., firms with a leverage
increase are in the top quartile of the industry) and the markets in which these
firms are located. Then, I calculate multimarket contact between the financially
weak firm and other firms in that market from another industry. If there are firms
from more than one industry in that market, I randomly assign one industry and
examine the expansion of firms in that industry. For example, if Firm A in the
grocery store industry operating in Market 1 becomes financially weak, I calculate
the multimarket contact between Firm A and other firms which are in the same
market, but from another industry (e.g., department stores). Then, I examine the
association of this multimarket contact on the expansion of those firms in that
market in the subsequent year. I use a probit model with the same specification
used in Section 1.4.1.
Table 1.7 reports the average partial effect from a probit model using these
artificial markets. The degree of multimarket contact with a financially weak firm
from another industry is not related to the expansion of other firms in the market
in which the financially weak firm is operating. Moreover, the magnitude and the
significance are similar to that of Table 1.6 in the case of competing with a non-
highly-leveraged competitor. That is, the effect of multimarket contact if a firm is
competing with a non-highly-leveraged competitor is about the same as in the case
of competing with a firm from another industry with respect to expansion. This
implies that multimarket contact matters only when predation is likely to be effective
and when firms are direct beneficiaries from predation. These results then help to
address alternative explanations for my results relating to endogenously determine
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leverage, multimarket contact, and expansion in a given market.
1.4.1.3 Expansion Following a Rival’s Credit Rating Changes
In the previous two sections, I define a firm as financially weak if its increase
in leverage is large compared to other firms in the same industry. The intuition is
that leverage makes a firm a potential target for predation by increasing its vulner-
ability to the adverse effects of temporarily low cash flows. However, as leverage is
a choice variable, it could be endogenously determined with other firms’ expansion
decisions. For example, a firm’s investing resources to keep up with competitors
that are expanding in a given market might issue more debt in order to finance that
investment. In this section, I define a firm as financially weak if it experiences a
deterioration in its credit rating. While a firm’s credit rating is determined, in part,
by its endogenous capital structure decisions, it is also determined, in part, by its
ability to generate a cash flow, as well as its future prospects, which are both partly
beyond a firm’s control.
A negative credit rating shock reflects increased expected difficulty in gen-
erating sufficient cash flow to service a firm’s debt, much less finance investment in
operations and advertising in order to compete effectively in the future. In addition,
a firm facing a negative credit shock may have more difficulty obtaining additional
external capital in the future. In particular, the existing literature identifies the
boundary between investment grade and non-investment grade as a critical point
in credit rating distributions, as many contracts have clauses directly written on
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this cutoff.18 Analogous to my approach with leverage changes, I identify the firm
experiencing the largest decline in credit rating in a given market during the past
year, and classify that firm as financially weak if its credit rating drops from invest-
ment grade (Standard & Poor’s rating from AAA to BBB-) to non-investment grade
(Standard & Poor’s rating from BB+ to D). The other details of the estimation are
similar to those in Section 1.4.1.1.
Table 1.8 reports the results. Consistent with the results in Section 1.4.1.1,
firms having a higher degree of multimarket contact with a financially weak com-
petitor tend to expand in a market in which they compete. More specifically, a one
standard deviation increase in the sales-based multimarket contact measure with
respect to a financially weak competitor is associated with an 11% increase in the
probability of expansion (14.6% when I only include publicly-traded firms in the
sample). I also examine cases where the firm with the largest credit rating drop
experiences a decrease within the investment grade or non-investment grade cate-
gories rather than from the investment grade to non-investment grade. I find that
multimarket contact has a slightly positive relationship with expansion if the decline
is within the non-investment grade, and no effect if the decline is within the invest-
ment grade. While such declines may alter predatory incentives within a market
some, these effects should be weaker than when a competitor moves from investment
to non-investment grade. Thus, the results overall when I use credit rating changes
to identify financially weak firms are similar to those where I use leverage changes.
18See Beaver et al. (2006)
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1.4.1.4 Advertisement Spending Following a Rival’s Leverage Changes
While most of my analyses focus on aggressive behavior through expansion,
I also measure a firm’s aggressive behavior using advertising expenditures. Firms
may advertise heavily in order to steal market share in a rival’s markets, and possi-
bly eliminate a weak rival. This can be a more prompt way of being aggressive than
expansion because store openings take time. However, because an increase in adver-
tising can easily be reversed in the future, it may not commit a firm to aggressive
behavior as effectively as expanding does. Moreover, expanding while a weak firm
is still present may preempt the entry of other competitors after the weak firm is
eliminated from the market. Advertising may be less effective at such preemption.
The advertisement expenditure data are provided at the level of a DMA.
A DMA identifies TV stations that best reach an area, and classifies the region in
which a population receives the same media offerings. There are 210 DMAs in the
US, and each DMA covers one or more local markets defined at the first three digits
of the five-digit zip code level. When multiple local markets are associated with
the same DMA, I only examine the local market in which the firm experiencing the
largest increase in leverage compared to the other firms in that DMA is operating.
That is, I assume that a firm advertises aggressively in a given DMA in order to
steal market share from the firm with the most leverage increase in a specific local
market which is covered by that DMA.19
The estimation procedure is similar to that in Section 1.4.1.1. In a given
19I also conduct a test re-defining a local market at the DMA level and constructing multimarket
measures at the DMA level. I find that the results still hold.
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DMA, I identify the firm experiencing the largest increase in leverage during the
past year and the market in which that firm is operating. If the firm with the
largest leverage increase is located in more than one market in a given DMA, I
include all observations from these markets in the estimation. I then calculate the
multimarket contact between the firm experiencing the largest increase in leverage
and the other firms in that market using the sales amount during the past year.
Finally, I investigate the advertisement spending of other firms in that DMA. The
advertisement spending is defined as the natural log of the firm’s local media ad-
vertisement spending plus nationwide media advertisement expenditures divided by
the total number of DMAs in which a firm is operating.
I estimate a linear regression model with market-industry-year fixed effects.
The dependent variable is firm’s advertisement spending at the DMA level, and the
independent variables are the firm’s multimarket contact with the firm experiencing
the largest leverage increase, its own leverage level, its total sales, and its market
shares and market dependence averaged within a DMA if it operates in more than
one market in a given DMA.
Table 1.9 presents the results. These results are less clear than the results
using the expansion decisions to identify aggressive behavior. Although multimarket
contact with a weak firm is positively related to advertisement expenditures in the
market, the differences between the case where the firm experiencing the largest
increase in leverage is weak and the case where the firm is not weak are small. A
one-standard deviation increase in multimarket contact with the firm experiencing
the largest increase in leverage is associated with a rise in advertisement spending
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of $1.86 million if the firm with the leverage increase is financially weak, and a rise
of about $1.8 million if the firm is not financially weak.
This could indicate that firms in the industries I study do not rely on adver-
tising to predate on weak rivals, because this mechanism does not provide sufficient
commitment to aggressive behavior. On the other hand, it could reflect an inherent
limit of examining local advertising. Many of the firms in the industries I study op-
erate regionally or even nationally. If a firm seeks to predate upon a weak rival with
which it competes across an entire region through advertising, it would probably find
regional, rather than local, advertising the most cost effective way of doing so. My
measure of advertising would omit such expenditures, and may therefore be missing
an important piece of how firms compete with the rivals through advertising.
1.4.2 During the Financial Crisis: Expansion Against a Financially Con-
strained Rival
In the previous sections, I identify financially weak firms using either the
increase in leverage or a negative shock to the credit ratings. However, it is possible
that these changes are expected ex ante, which in turn, endogenously determines ex-
pansion or advertisement information. For example, a weak firm may raise leverage
ex ante to illustrate its pre-commitment to its competitors that have high multimar-
ket contact with it, if it expects those competitors to expand aggressively.20 The
placebo test in Section 1.4.1.2 provides some comfort that this endogeneity problem
does not drive my results. Nevertheless, to further address this endogeneity concern,
20Brander and Lewis (1986) argued that when a manager has limited liability, debt effectively
commits the firm to more aggressive behavior.
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I use the recent financial crisis as a quasi-natural experiment in which to study the
effect of an unanticipated change in the vulnerability of a highly-leveraged firm to
predation.
During the financial crisis, firms had difficulty in rolling over existing debt
and obtaining additional financing, and therefore, faced tighter financing constraints.
This made it especially difficult for an already highly-leveraged firm to endure losses
without failing. Thus, incentives to predate upon weak rivals were likely to be
especially strong during this period. I define firms that were already highly leveraged
before the crisis as firms which are potentially more vulnerable to predation during
the crisis. The identifying assumption is that the multimarket contact level a firm
has with a highly-leveraged competitor before the financial crisis is not positively
correlated with any unobserved within-firm changes making that firm aggressive
against the highly-leveraged competitor during the crisis.
The estimation procedure is similar to the procedure in Section 1.4.1.1. In
a given market, I identify the firm with the highest level of leverage in the past
year, and whether that firm’s leverage is in the top quartile in its industry.21 Then,
I investigate whether those firms expand more during the year if they had higher mul-
timarket contact with the highly-leveraged firm. Since I expect a highly-leveraged
firm to face more predatory behavior by its competitors during the crisis, I use a
difference-in-difference estimation approach by including the interaction term of the
21The increase in book leverage is used when I identify firms experiencing the largest leveraged
increase. The results are consistent when market leverage is used, but with less power. In addition,
the results are consistent when the absolute change in leverage is used instead of the percentage
change.
32
firm’s lagged multimarket contact with a highly-leveraged firm and a dummy vari-
able indicating the period of the crisis. The period of the crisis is assumed to be the
years 2008 and 2009.
Table 1.10 reports the results from a linear probability model with market-
industry fixed effects. During the crisis, firms tended not to expand, on average, but
firms having a one standard deviation higher degree of multimarket contact with
a highly-leveraged firm were 3.23% more likely to expand during the crisis. Mul-
timarket contact with a highly-leveraged firm outside of the crisis does not appear
to be associated with expansion. The relationship is stronger for public firms, with
the probability of expansion increasing by 10.27% with a one-standard deviation
increase in multimarket contact with a highly-leveraged firm. These findings sug-
gest that the tighter financial constraint during the crisis makes a highly-leveraged
firm more susceptible to predation, and lend further support to the results in the
previous sections.
1.4.3 Impact of Competitive Overlap on Leverage Decisions
1.4.3.1 Average Multimarket Contact Level and Leverage
In Section 1.4.1, I find evidence that firms competing with the same com-
petitors in many markets (i.e., having a higher degree of competitive overlap) are
more likely to be aggressive if the competitors become financially weak. If this
threat of being predated upon is a meaningful cost of taking on leverage, firms
should adopt more conservative financial policies when the threat of such predation
is high. Thus, in this section, I investigate how the threat of predation due to the
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competitive overlap affects firms’ financial structure decisions.
To accomplish this goal, I first estimate the effect of a firm’s overall de-
gree of multimarket contact on the leverage level by estimating Leveragei,t =
α+ βMMCfirmi,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + Y earDummyt. MMCfirmi,t is a firm-level mul-
timarket contact variable. Book, market, net book, and net market leverage are
considered dependent variables; the control variables in Xi,t are Sales, Profitability,
Market to Book, Tangibility, Dividend, and Average Stock Return.
Since the multimarket measures (i.e., MMCC and MMCS) are normalized
by the firm’s total number of markets or the total number of sales, the cross sec-
tional variation in these measures disappears if I take the average of those measures
across different competitors. Instead, I construct a Herfindahl index-style measure
by taking the average of the product of the multimarket contact measures. More





jMMCSij ·MMCSji). Conceptually, it is the sum of the significance of each
competitor j for firm i across different competitors, giving weight to how significant
firm i is to each firm j.22
Table 1.11 presents the estimation results. It shows that if a firm has a
higher degree of multimarket contact, it is more likely to maintain a low leverage. A
one-standard deviation increase in a firm’s average multimarket contact is associated
with a decline in its book leverage by 2.89% in the subsequent year. The result is
weaker with market leverage, partly because movements in stock prices make market
22Alternative firm level multimarket measures are constructed as
∑
j
(MMCCij)2. The signs of
coefficients are consistent with coefficients in Table 1.11 with less power.
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leverage a noisier measure of the impact of the capital structure decisions.
1.4.3.2 Impact of Multimarket Contact Changes on Leverage Decisions
Following Mergers Events
To further identify the effect of the threat of predation on leverage, I examine
the effects of changes in multimarket contact due to mergers. A merger between
two firms can result in either a large or small change in the amount of multimarket
contact between those firms and other firms. Since the merger decision is made by
those two firms, the changes in the amount of multimarket contact for other firms
due to the merger is plausibly exogenous with respect to those other firms’ capital
structure decisions.
The estimation procedure is as follows. First, firms going through mergers
(including the purchase of stores from other firms) are identified in each year. Then,
the change in other firms’ multimarket contact with those firms before and after the
merger event is calculated. Also, all other independent variables are constructed at
the change level, before and after the merger event (i.e., if a merger occurs between
t and t− 1, 4X is defined as Xt−Xt−1). A dependent variable is calculated in the
following year after the merger event (i.e., 4Y = Y t+1 − Y t).
Table 1.12 reports the results. It illustrates that firms’ leverage change has
a negative relationship with the multimarket contact changes due to the competi-
tors’ mergers. A one-standard deviation increase in multimarket contact in a given
year, due to the competitors’ merger leads to a leverage decrease in the subsequent
year by 2.11%. Both of the results in Section 1.11 and Section 1.12 support the
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argument that firms do adjust the financial leverage to take into account the threat
of predation.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter provides evidence that firms competing with the same com-
petitors in more markets face a higher risk of predation, and that this risk feeds
back into the capital structure decisions. More specifically, I test the idea that
more competitive overlap with a financially weak competitor leads to its competitor
have a more aggressive behavior, because these competitors internalize more benefits
from impairing or eliminating the financially weak firm. Using store-level location
data and advertisement expenditure data for retail stores, I find that firms having a
higher degree of competitive overlap with a firm with a drastic leverage increase or
a negative credit rating shock are more likely to expand and increase advertisements
in the markets in which they compete. The relationship was stronger during the
recent financial crisis, which arguably is a period of severe financing constraints.
Finally, I present evidence that firms choose more conservative capital structures
when they face a higher risk of predation as a result of having more competitive
overlap with the same competitors. This chapter sheds light on the cross-sectional
variation in financially weak firms’ product market behavior by introducing different
levels of predation risk. In particular, this chapter provides clearer evidence of firm’s
predatory behavior by looking at the competitive decisions of highly-leveraged firm’s
rivals, which vary with the predation incentives captured by the degree of multimar-
ket contact.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of the Number of Stores
Grocery store Discount store Department store
Public Private Public Private Public Private
year Firms Stores Firms Stores Firms Stores Firms Stores Firms Stores Firms Stores
2003 24 5604 209 2415 7 3459 11 1080 19 2231 10 68
2005 22 5951 217 2532 7 4575 12 267 17 2241 14 208
2007 21 6400 225 2965 7 5482 12 381 19 3214 14 207
2009 19 6065 221 2968 9 4720 8 338 18 3165 12 67
2011 19 5247 207 2926 8 4682 10 324 17 2568 10 51
Pharmacy Wholesale club
Public Private Public Private
year Firms Stores Firms Stores Firms Stores Firms Stores
2003 13 67 10 17 3 720 0 0
2005 11 105 11 21 3 815 0 0
2007 8 87 14 44 3 1030 2 3
2009 8 80 11 32 3 1030 3 82
2011 9 53 8 16 3 933 3 6
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Advertisement Spending
(unit: million dollars)
Grocery store Discount store Department store
Firms Mean StD Firms Mean StD Firms Mean StD
Network TV 838 0 0.002 69 31.364 68.202 184 11.361 36.153
Cable TV 838 0.001 0.012 69 14.436 36.897 184 4.554 15.43
Syndication 838 0 0.003 69 6.941 19.343 184 1.653 6.77
Spot TV 838 1.438 4.27 69 11.116 21.16 184 5.082 11.562
Magazine 838 0.031 0.234 69 10.786 28.163 184 6.263 13.683
Sunday magazine 838 0.003 0.039 69 2.946 12.939 184 0.514 2.535
Natl newspaper 838 0.004 0.049 69 0.731 2.357 184 2.118 5.641
Newspaper 838 1.394 3.211 69 19.331 37.145 184 33.644 74.61
Network radio 838 0.001 0.027 69 1.228 4.361 184 1.222 4.026
Spot radio 838 0.446 2.954 69 1.96 4.824 184 1.241 3.444
Outdoor 838 0.014 0.06 69 0.088 0.239 184 0.02 0.058
Total 838 3.459 9.133 69 101.715 204.103 184 67.852 143.208
Pharmacy Wholesale club
Firms Mean StD Firms Mean StD
Network TV 70 2.45 8.223 16 0.407 0.745
Cable TV 70 2.867 8.609 16 0.502 0.94
Syndication 70 1.377 4.466 16 0.106 0.305
Spot TV 70 1.326 3.014 16 0.629 1.168
Magazine 70 1.284 3.393 16 0.96 2.088
Sunday magazine 70 0.289 0.965 16 0.666 2.045
Natl newspaper 70 0.026 0.128 16 0.044 0.056
Newspaper 70 13.199 23.392 16 1.633 1.804
Network radio 70 0.965 3.155 16 1.671 3.522
Spot radio 70 0.654 2.394 16 0.531 0.686
Outdoor 70 0.024 0.067 16 0.001 0.012






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Multimarket Contact (MMC ) Measures
This table shows the summary statistics of multimarket contact measures, MMCS (sales-based
multimarket contact measure) and MMCC (count-based multimarket contact measure) within the same









where sim (sjm) is sales of firm i (firm j) in
market m, and Si is firm i’s total sales across all markets and Smis the sum of sales of all firms in market
m (i.e., Si =
∑
m












where Iim (Ijm) is an
indicator function with the value of 1 if firm i (firm j) operates in market m, Ni is the total number of








year Sales-based Multimarket Contact measures (MMCS) Count-based Multimarket Contact measure (MMCC)
Grocer Discnt Deparmt Pharm Wholesl Grocer Discnt Deparmt Pharm Wholesl
2003 Mean 0.353 0.447 0.194 0.110 0.211 0.180 0.246 0.182 0.095 0.197
Std Dev 0.170 0.190 0.043 0.217 0.083 0.087 0.095 0.053 0.140 0.083
Num of firms 235 17 20 25 3 235 17 20 25 3
2005 Mean 0.364 0.492 0.203 0.124 0.228 0.187 0.286 0.172 0.093 0.191
Std Dev 0.167 0.183 0.052 0.233 0.096 0.090 0.101 0.042 0.163 0.079
Num of firms 242 17 19 24 3 242 17 19 24 3
2007 Mean 0.395 0.543 0.229 0.152 0.026 0.189 0.320 0.176 0.118 0.250
Std Dev 0.180 0.200 0.067 0.230 0.070 0.094 0.115 0.061 0.160 0.066
Num of firms 251 18 21 25 5 251 18 21 25 5
2009 Mean 0.391 0.471 0.232 0.142 0.304 0.190 0.311 0.180 0.090 0.252
Std Dev 0.175 0.210 0.057 0.241 0.120 0.093 0.118 0.050 0.121 0.069
Num of firms 242 16 18 21 6 242 16 18 21 6
2011 Mean 0.391 0.505 0.230 0.175 0.336 0.196 0.298 0.197 0.161 0.254
Std Dev 0.178 0.190 0.064 0.246 0.209 0.097 0.089 0.063 0.174 0.095
Num of firms 228 17 17 19 6 228 17 17 19 6
Total Mean 0.379 0.492 0.217 0.139 0.284 0.188 0.292 0.181 0.110 0.237
Std Dev 0.175 0.193 0.058 0.229 0.133 0.092 0.105 0.054 0.152 0.076
Num of firms 1198 85 95 114 23 1198 85 95 114 23
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Table 1.5: Example of multimarket contact (MMC ) measures








where sim (sjm) is sales of firm i (firm j) in market m, and Si is firm i’s total sales across
all markets and Smis the sum of sales of all firms in market m (i.e., Si =
∑
m













where Iim (Ijm) is an indicator function with the value of 1 if firm i (firm
j) operates in market m, Ni is the total number of markets where firm i is operating, and Nmis the total
number of competing firms in market m (i.e., Ni =
∑
m




Firm i Firm j Year MMCSij MMCCij Salesi Salesj
SAFEWAY A&P 2003 0.004 0.014 10.38589 9.28678
SAFEWAY A&P 2005 0.003 0.013 10.48634 9.292373
SAFEWAY A&P 2007 0.003 0.012 10.60125 8.832043
SAFEWAY A&P 2009 0.007 0.015 10.69431 9.160749
SAFEWAY A&P 2011 0.005 0.014 10.62255 8.996956
GIANT FOOD A&P 2003 0.050 0.070 11.09321 9.28678
GIANT FOOD A&P 2005 0.043 0.060 11.16191 9.292373
GIANT FOOD A&P 2007 0.047 0.062 10.98897 8.832043
GIANT FOOD A&P 2009 0.081 0.083 10.48577 9.160749












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.11: Multimarket Contact (MMC ) and Leverage Decisions
This table reports the results of a linear regression model with a dependent variable, leverage level. Firm-





MMCCij ·MMCCji . (See Table 1.4 for the definitions of MMCS and MMCC). Book Leverage is
measured as the book debt over the book value of the total assets, Market Leverage is book debt over
market value, Net Book Leverage is book debt minus cash and marketable securities over total assets, and
Net Market Leverage is book debt minus cash and marketable securities over market value. See Table 1.3
for the definitions of the other independent variables. All independent variables are one year lagged and
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at
10%.
Dependent variable
Book Leverage Market Leverage Net Book Leverage Net Market Leverage
MMCS firm -0.851* -0.365 -1.197** -0.723
(-1.90) (-0.81) (-2.33) (-1.47)
MMCC firm -1.058** -0.626 -1.576*** -1.053**
(-2.42) (-1.42) (-3.15) (-2.19)
Sales 0.0610*** 0.0585*** 0.0268*** 0.0233** 0.0766*** 0.0720*** 0.0363*** 0.0320***
(6.07) (5.67) (2.66) (2.25) (6.68) (6.07) (3.29) (2.81)
Sales Growth 0.0831 0.0832 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.168** 0.168** 0.248*** 0.248***
(1.43) (1.42) (3.71) (3.70) (2.52) (2.50) (3.85) (3.83)
Profitability -0.588*** -0.571*** -1.187*** -1.172*** -0.978*** -0.951*** -1.268*** -1.247***
(-2.98) (-2.89) (-5.94) (-5.86) (-4.34) (-4.18) (-5.80) (-5.68)
Market to Book -0.0326** -0.0309** -0.0707*** -0.0700*** -0.0380** -0.0357** -0.0667*** -0.0652***
(-2.52) (-2.37) (-5.40) (-5.32) (-2.57) (-2.38) (-4.65) (-4.52)
Tangibility 0.0748 0.0644 0.154* 0.144* 0.191** 0.173* 0.223** 0.209**
(0.95) (0.82) (1.94) (1.82) (2.13) (1.92) (2.57) (2.40)
Avg Stock Return -0.0545 -0.0570 0.00254 -0.000645 -0.0449 -0.0496 -0.00829 -0.0123
(-0.95) (-0.99) (0.04) (-0.01) (-0.69) (-0.75) (-0.13) (-0.19)
Observation 232 231 232 231
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Table 1.12: Leverage Changes Depending on the Multimarket Contact (MMC )
Changes Caused by Rival’s M&A
This table reports the results of a linear regression model with a dependent variable, leverage changes.
Multimarket contact changes (i.e., 4MMCS, 4MMCC) are calculated in two steps: 1) firms acquiring
other firms (including the purchase of stores from other firms) are identified in each industry in each year,
2) the changes of multimarket contact of those firms with the other firms before and after the M&A event
are calculated (i.e., 4MMCS = MMCSafter rival′s M&A −MMCSbefore rival′s M&A and 4MMCC =
MMCCafter rival′s M&A −MMCCbefore rival′s M&A, and see Table 1.4 for the definitions of MMCS and
MMCC). All other independent variables are constructed at the change level before and after the M&A
event (i.e., 4X = Xafter rival′s M&A − Xbefire rival′s M&A, and see Table 1.3 for the definitions of the
independent variables. All dependent variables are calculated in the following year after the M&A event
(i.e., 4Y = Y t+1 − Y t where t is the year of the M&A event). Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
Dependent variable
4Book Leverage 4Market Leverage 4Net Book Leverage 4Net Market Leverage
4MMCS -0.143** -0.0415 -0.170* -0.0337
(-2.21) (-0.34) (-1.92) (-0.27)
4MMCC -0.302 -0.162 -0.313 -0.126
(-1.11) (-0.50) (-1.00) (-0.38)
4Sales 0.126 0.123 0.0891 0.0885 0.0775 0.0735 0.0657 0.0651
(1.18) (1.18) (0.91) (0.91) (0.68) (0.67) (0.69) (0.69)
4Profitability -0.448 -0.448 -0.0598 -0.0529 -0.456 -0.461 0.0316 0.0367
(-0.83) (-0.87) (-0.10) (-0.09) (-0.83) (-0.88) (0.05) (0.06)
4Market to Book -0.00881 -0.00745 -0.00530 -0.00472 -0.0103* -0.00881 -0.00642 -0.00596
(-1.59) (-1.25) (-0.79) (-0.68) (-1.68) (-1.33) (-0.97) (-0.86)
4Tangibility 0.299 0.285 0.195 0.184 0.130 0.117 0.0537 0.0449
(1.09) (1.13) (0.49) (0.48) (0.41) (0.39) (0.14) (0.13)
4Avg Stock Return -0.0102 -0.00979 0.0323 0.0321 0.0200 0.0206 0.0486 0.0485
(-0.68) (-0.63) (0.85) (0.86) (0.78) (0.81) (1.18) (1.19)



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cash Flow Shocks and Predatory Behavior
2.1 Introduction
Researchers have studied the aggressive behavior of corporations in an at-
tempt to take advantage of financially weak competitors. More specifically, Chevalier
(1995a,b); Campello (2003, 2006) conduct investigations of firms investing aggres-
sively when their competitors are highly leveraged, while Opler and Titman (1994)
focus their research on financially constrained firms losing their large market share
to their peers. The basic premise is that financial constraints can restrict firms’
ability to compete. This financial strain gives their competitors the incentives to
compete aggressively to obtain a better competitive position in the future.
In this chapter, I investigate how internally generated funds affect product
market competition. While many studies have focused on how product market
decisions are affected by external financing conditions (e.g., leverage), few papers
have investigated the impact of the internal financing condition. For instance, Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990) illustrate how internal capital availability affects firms’ ability
to predate on peers and deter their own predation. In line with this literature, I
explore the idea that a firm’s limited amount of internal funds, particularly arising
from cash flow shortfalls, induces aggressive behavior in competitors by leading the
firm to become a target of predation.
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One of the many challenges in examining the impact of competitor’s cash flow
shortfalls on product market competition is that competitors’ cash flow changes are
potentially endogenous with respect to a firm’s behavior. I address this endogeneity
problem in several ways. First, I focus on retail store chains operating across many
geographical markets and investigate a firm’s reaction in a given market when its
competitors face cash flow shortfalls outside of that market. Since the shock reducing
competitors’ cash flows occurs outside of the focal market, it is less likely that the
firm responds to the shock, except through its competition with its peers in that
market.
Second, I focus on the 2008-2009 financial crisis period, in which retail store
chains were hit by a negative demand shock which was hardly expected ex ante.
More importantly, the magnitude of the decline in demand varied across the local
markets. This variation in the local economic condition provides enough cross-
sectional differences in cash flow shortfalls across firms depending on their store
location distribution. In addition, since firms faced difficulty in obtaining additional
external financing, the impact of internal funds on deterring or engaging in predation
was large.
I begin my investigation by collecting store location and store-level sale data
for grocery stores, discount stores, department stores, wholesale clubs, and phar-
macies. I focus on these industries, because they sell relatively undifferentiated
products at low margins, which makes their profitability vulnerable to aggressive
behavior that increases competitive pressure in the short-run. In addition, firms in
these industries typically operate across many local markets, which enables me to
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compare firm’s decisions in different markets with different economic and competi-
tive environments.
I then collect data on local economic conditions, such as population, unem-
ployment, income, house ownership cost, house value, and rent. These variables
will be used to estimate the demand on retail products in each local market, and
ultimately to measure firms’ cash flow changes in each market.
To analyze my data, I adopt an instrumental variable approach. I first define
local markets at the level of the first three digits of the five-digit zip codes. I then
measure a firm’s market dependence, which captures how much of a percentage of the
firm’s sales is generated from each market in each year using store-level sales data.
The changes in cash flows generated by each firm in each market are instrumented
by interacting a lagged-market dependence measure with the measures capturing
the local economic conditions. This serves as a useful instrument because both the
lagged-market dependence and the local market conditions are rarely affected by
the firm’s decisions in the current year.
I find that a firm expands more in a given market when it competes with
peers that are losing more of their cash flows in the other markets. A 10% decrease
in competitors’ cash flows on average leads to an economically significant increase
in the probability of expansion by 1.9%. This result calls for further investigation,
as a local market may not be completely independent from another market.
The economic condition in a market can be correlated with that of its neigh-
boring markets. Thus, I conduct a further test to try to address this concern. I
measure competitors’ cash flows generated outside of a given market, excluding the
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sales from the markets located in the same states with the focal market. The nega-
tive relationship between expansion and the peer’s cash flow changes still holds but
the magnitude is smaller. Since many retail store chains tend to be clustered in a
few states, excluding any cash flow changes from the same state minimizes the effect
of a cash flow shock that a firm faces during a crisis.
The next step is to extend the baseline analysis to an external financing
dimension. During the crisis, firms faced tighter external financing constraints. In
Chapter 1, I illustrate that an already highly-leveraged firm before the crisis is more
likely to be a victim of predation during the crisis. Thus, if an already highly-
leveraged firm was hit by a negative cash flow shock, it is especially more vulnerable
to predation when compared to a firm hit by the same shock, but maintaining a
conservative capital structure. I find that the impact of the leverage-weighted cash
flow of rivals decrease on expansion is much more significant than that of the baseline
analysis (i.e., the effect of the non-leverage-weighted cash flow changes of rivals).
Finally, I examine the impact of the competitive overlap on firms’ aggressive
behavior in relation to their cash flow changes. As I illustrate in the model in Section
1.2, a firm should behave more aggressively against a financially weak competitor
if it faces that competitor in many other markets. The intuition is that a firm
with a more competitive overlap can possibly capture more of the future monopoly
rents from driving the competitor into financial distress. This prediction should
hold, regardless of what the source of the competitor’s weakness is if it increases
the likelihood of being pushed towards financial distress. Thus, I expect a greater
impact of the competitor’s cash flow shortfalls on the firm’s expansion decision if
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they have a higher degree of competitive overlap. Consistent with the prediction,
the result is stronger when the decrease in the competitors’ cash flows is measured
by giving more weight to the decline in the cash flow of rivals, if the rival has a
greater degree of competitive overlap with a reacting firm.
This chapter adds new evidence to the literature which finds that financially
vulnerable firms experience more aggressive behavior from their competitors. For
example, Chevalier (1995a,b) shows that when a grocery store chain becomes highly-
leveraged as a result of a leveraged buyout (LBO), its competitors are more likely
to enter or expand into the LBO firm’s local markets, and prices fall in the markets
in which low-leveraged rivals compete with an LBO firm, suggesting that the rival
lowers prices to induce the LBO firm’s exit. Similarly, Campello (2003, 2006) finds
the sales growth of a highly-leveraged firm to be lower than its peers in the industries
in which the peers are relatively unleveraged during recessions. While these papers
find evidence on how a firm’s external financing condition ( i.e., leverage) affects the
behavior of its peers, I find evidence on how the internal financing condition has an
impact on it.
This chapter has a similar spirit to a strand of literature which finds that
internal funds enhance a firm’s competitive strength in product market competi-
tion. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) argue that a firm’s internal capital availability
is an important determinant of its survival , because it enables the firm to miti-
gate the risk of predation. Similarly, Froot et al. (1993) suggest that a negative
shock to cash flows can make a firm reduce its investment when external financ-
ing is costly, while a firm with internal funds attempts to gain market share by
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increasing investment. Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) support this idea, illustrating
that group-affiliated firms compete more aggressively than stand-alone firms against
competitors’ entry. Khanna and Tice (2000, 2001) also find that multi-segment in-
cumbents respond more efficiently than stand-alone incumbents to Wal-Mart’s entry
into the discount department store industry.
These studies focus on the role of internal capital markets on product market
competition by comparing firms affiliated with corporate groups or multi-segment
firms to stand-alone peers. However, it can be problematic because a group-affiliated
firm is systematically different from stand-alone entities. Rather, this chapter com-
pares a firm to its peers in the case where both the firm and its peers are operating
across many local markets, but have different amounts of internal funds. Thus, I
focus more on the impact of the internal funds, than on the internal capital markets.
This approach is similar to the approach in Boutin et al. (2013), who investigate the
impact of group cash holdings on firm’s entry decision into the French manufactur-
ing industries. They find that entry into the manufacturing industries is negatively
related to the group cash holdings of the incumbent firms; this effect is smaller when
the entrant is affiliated with cash-rich groups.
The organization of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Section II intro-
duces the data, Section III explains the empirical specification, Section IV presents




2.2.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction
To test the predictions, I focus on five retail industries: grocery stores, whole-
sale clubs, department stores, discount stores, and pharmacies.1 These industries
offer several advantages for studying competition among firms. In these industries,
firms are less likely to compete by differentiating products than other retail indus-
tries, as they sell many of the same products and face fairly similar demand changes
over time.2 Rather, they tend to compete with the rivals by reducing prices, opening
more stores near the competitors’ stores, or advertising more.
The data comes primarily from two sources: Reference USA and Census
American Community Survey. Reference USA is a database that contains detailed
information on almost every retailer in the US at the establishment level. It consists
of snapshots of detailed store information, such as store name, address, phone num-
ber, sales volume, the number of employee, parent company information, industry
classification, and the population in which the store is located (at the 5 digit zip
code level). I use snapshots of this information at the end of the 2007, 2009, and
2011 for all stores in each industry with at least 100 employees.3
I cleaned the data, making store names and parent firm names consistent;
1SIC codes for grocery stores , wholesale clubs , department stores, discount stores, and phar-
macies are 541105, 531110, 531102, 591205, and 573117, respectively.
2To some extent, there is product differentiation in these industries. For example, many grocery
stores sell private label products (those manufactured or provided by a manufacturer for offer under
a retailer’s brand), and some department stores may sell products from more luxurious brands than
others.
3My sample is biased towards large stores and the number of observations is unbalanced across
different industries. For example, I have fewer observations in the pharmacy industry than in the
other four industries because individual pharmacies tend to have fewer employee.
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then I eliminated multiple store observations for the same parent firm at a given
address in the same year. I manually matched parent firms to stores using the
Corporate Affiliations database when information was missing from the Reference
USA data, or if stores with the same name showed different parent firm names in
the same year.4 If the records of a store were dropped from the database in certain
years and then reappeared in later years, I filled in the missing records. 5 Table
1.1 in Chapter 1 illustrates that public firms tend to own more stores than private
firms. The number of stores increased the most in 2007, while it decreased in 2009
and 2011, following the onset of the financial crisis.
I obtain US county-level data which is closely related to the local economic
conditions, from the Census American Community Survey (ACS). The data is based
on a annual survey of 3 million US residents from 2007 to 2011.6 I use the informa-
tion on total population, the unemployment rate for the population for 16 years old,
and inflation adjusted per capital income. I expect demand in a local market to be
positively related to its population and to income, while I expect it to be negatively
associated with unemployment.
I use real estate related information in identifying the local economic condi-
tions because there was a significant drop in real estate prices during the 2008-2009
4In some cases, stores with the same name are owned by different parent firms in different regions
due to store-level buyouts.
5These missing records may be partly due to the screening rule of 100 employee.That is, a store
may be dropped from the data because its employee headcount falls below 100, but it will reappear
later if its headcount later exceeds 100 again.
6The disadvantage of ACS data is that it is based on survey data which can be inaccurate.
Regardless, ACS county-level income data illustrates similar patterns with IRS income tax data
over time.
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financial crisis; this could affect consumer’s purchasing power. More specifically,
I include the information on median house values for all owner-occupied housing
units, the median gross rent, and the median monthly owner expenses as a percent-
age of household income. The monthly owner expenses as a percentage of household
income provide information on the cost of monthly housing expenses, which includes
the sum of payments for mortgages, deeds of trust, contracts to purchase, real es-
tate taxes, utilities, and fuel.7 I expect that house values and rent have a positive
effect on local demand and house owner expenses are negatively associated with the
demand.
I construct variables which capture the changes in demand in the local mar-
kets; percentage changes are calculated for population, income, house value, rents,
the unemployment rate, and house owner expenses over a year. Table 2.2 presents
the summary statistics of these variables. In 2009, the unemployment rate signifi-
cantly increased, and the decline in income and house values were substantial. The
decreasing trend continued in 2010 for income and house values. In 2011, the eco-
nomic condition recovers with an increasing income and decreasing unemployment,
while the house values continued to drop, on average.
Firm’s financial data was obtained from the Compustat annual database
from 2007 to 2011. Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of these variables.
Leverage is measured as the book debt over the book vale of the total assets, Sales
is sales in logs, Cash Holdings is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable
securities to net assets, and Tobin’s Q is defined as the sum of the book value of
7See https://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/QbyQfact/monthly cost.pdf for details.
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assets plus the difference between the market value and book value of equity minus
the deferred taxes over the book value of assets.
2.2.2 Definitions of Local Markets and Aggressiveness
I define a local market at the level of the first three digits of the five-digit
zip codes following Khanna and Tice (2005). They suggest that the area covered
by a three-digit zip code appears to be a population center and retail stores tend to
be clustered around such centers. The size of this area is smaller than the size of
the metropolitan statistical area (MSA).8 In my sample, there are 841, 830, and 829
different local markets in 2005, 2007, and 2011, respectively, and four stores that
compete with each other in a market-industry on average.
I measure firms’ aggressive behavior in a given market using expansion (i.e.,
store opening). Price competition is not explored in this chapter because it is difficult
to collect firms’ market-level pricing data.9 However, firms in these industries may
prefer expansion over price competition; expansion tends to preempt the entry of
other competitors after the weak firm is eliminated from the market. Expansion is
defined if a new store appears in Reference USA that was not present in the previous
year.10
8Some studies define a local market at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA). It may more
coincide with identifiable physical features such as population than ZIP Codes but is too big to
ensure that stores in this area compete directly with each other.
9While some previous studies have investigated price competition using city-level price index
or scanner data, they are very limited. A city-level price index hardly provides us with enough
information on which firm triggers the price changes; scanner data is only available for a few firms
in a few specific markets, although it offers very detailed pricing information, when compared to a
city-level price index.
10Although the data obtained from Reference USA is biennial (2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011)
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2.3 Hypotheses and Empirical Specifications
I test whether a firm is more likely to compete aggressively in a market which
it shares with competitors, when its competitors have a limited amount of internal
funds. I focus on the changes in internal funds through the cash flow changes; these
are measured using sales information at the store level. I also identify aggressive
behavior as an expansion decision.
Examining a firm’s behavior responding to a competitor’s cash flow shortfall
is challenging, because firms’ decisions are affected by many unobserved market
characteristics, and they are correlated with each other. For instance, if a firm loses
customers due to its poor product quality, we may observe both a firm’s low cash
flows and a competitor’s expansion responding to the increase in demand for its
product.
To deal with the potential endogeneity problem, I use a similar approach
to that of Lamont (1997), who examines the investment of the non-oil subsidiaries
of oil companies during the 1986 oil shock, which allows him to isolate the effect
of internal funds on investments from that of business profitability. I investigate
the firm’s reaction in a given market, when its competitors face cash flow shortfalls
outside of that market. Since the shock reducing competitors’ cash flows occurs
outside of the focal market, it is less likely that the firm responds to the shock,
except through its competition with its peers in that market.
I focus on the 2008-2009 financial crisis period. During this period, retail
it provides the date when records are added, which makes it possible to pin down the year of new
entry.
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store chains experienced a negative demand shock, which was hardly expected in
advance. Campello et al. (2010), Campello et al. (2011), and Almeida et al. (2011)
suggest that the 2008-2009 financial crisis offers a good setting for studying the
effects of financial condition on investments because while the shock significantly
affected firms’ decisions the original shock was less likely to be related to corpo-
rate financing environment. Moreover, the magnitude of the demand shock varied
across local markets, which provided enough cross-sectional differences in cash flow
shortfalls across firms, depending on the distribution of the store locations.
The basic specification is as follows:
Expansioni,m,t = β1∆Competitor CashF low fromOtherMarketsi,m,t
+β2∆OwnCashF low fromOtherMarketsi,m,t
+∆MarketConditionm,tλ +Xi,m,t−1δ1 + +Zi,t−1δ2
+α+ εi,m,t (2.3.1)
where Expansioni,m,t is firm i’s expansion decision in market m in year t, and
∆Competitor CashF low fromOtherMarketsi,m,t is the average cash flow changes




j 6=i 1j∈Jm ·
∑
n 6=m ∆CashF lowj,n,t
)
, where 1j∈Jm is an indication
function which equals to 1 if firm j is operating in marketm, and
∑
n 6=m ∆CashF lowj,n,t
is firm j’s percentage change in cash flows from all of the other markets in year
t). ∆OwnCashF low fromOtherMarketsi,m,t is firm i’s percentage change in
cash flows from all of the other markets in which it is operating in year t (i.e.,∑
n6=m ∆CashF lowi,n,t). ∆MarketConditionm,t is the change in economic condi-
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tions, such as population, unemployment, house value, gross rent, and house owner
expenses in market m in year t. Xi,m,t−1 controls for lagged firm-market level char-
acteristics (e.g., market share and market dependence), and Zi,t−1 for lagged firm
level characteristics (e.g., total sales, leverage, cash holdings, and Tobin’s Q).
Since the firm’s investment decision and its peer cash flow changes are simul-
taneously observed, it is possible that a firm’s investment decision in a given market
affects its peer’s business decisions, and thus, changes their cash flow distribution
across markets. Thus, I conduct a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of Eq.
(2.3.1), in which the change in competitor j’s cash flows generated in market n is
instrumented by the interaction of firm j’s lagged-market dependence on market m
and the changes in the local economic conditions in market n, i.e.,











where 1j∈Jm is an indication function which equals to 1 if the store of firm j is
located in market m, MarketDependencej,n,t−1 is firm j’s sales in market n divided
by its total sales over all markets, and ∆MarketConditionn,t is the change in
economic conditions in market n. The instrument is capturing the expected cash
flows generated from market n using information from the previous year on how
much of a percentage of firm j’s sales is generated from market n and the current
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economic conditions in market n. This serves as a useful instrument because both
the lagged-market dependence and the local market conditions are less likely to be
affected by the firm’s decisions in the current year.
I extend the baseline analysis to the external financing dimension. During
the crisis, firms faced tighter external financing constraints because they had a
difficult time rolling over the existing debt and raising additional capital. In Section
1.4.2, I illustrate the evidence that an already highly-leveraged firm before the crisis
is more likely to be a victim of predation during the crisis. Thus, I expect that if an
already highly-leveraged firm was hit by a negative cash flow shock, it is significantly
more vulnerable to predation, when compared to a peer hit by the same shock, but
maintaining a conservative capital structure.
I newly define ∆Competitor CashF low fromOtherMarketsi,m,t as:
∑
j 6=i




whereWeightj,before crisis equals to leveragej,before crisis if
∑
n6=m ∆CashF lowj,n,t ≤
0, and 1−leveragej,before crisis if
∑
n6=m ∆CashF lowj,n,t > 0. These weights are con-
structed in a way that provide more (less) weight to firm j’s cash flow decrease (in-
crease) if it is more leveraged. Then, ∆Competitor CashF low fromOtherMarketsi,m,t
is instrumented by
∑
j 6=i Weightj,before crisis·1j∈Jm ·
∑
n6=m MarketDependencej,n,t−1·
∆MarketConditionn,t, and Eq. (2.3.1) is estimated.
Finally, I examine the impact of competitive overlap between firms on their
aggressive behavior in relation to their cash flow changes. As I illustrate in the
model in Section 1.2, a firm should behave more aggressively against a financially
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weak competitor if it faces that competitor in many other markets. The intuition is
that a firm with more competitive overlap can possibly capture more of the future
monopoly rents from driving the competitor into financial distress. This prediction
should hold, regardless of what the source of the competitor’s weakness is if it
increases the likelihood of being pushed towards financial distress. Thus, I expect
a greater impact from the competitor’s cash flow shortfalls on a firm’s expansion
decision if they have a higher degree of competitive overlap.
Now, ∆Competitor CashF low fromOtherMarketsi,m,tchanges to:
∑
j 6=i




where MMCSi,j,t−1 is the sales-based multimarket contact measure, which captures
the competitive overlap between firm i and firm j in year t−1. MMCSi,j,t−1 is mea-










, where sim (sjm) is the sales of firm i (firm j)
in market m, Si is firm i’s total sales across all markets, and Sm is the sum of sales of
all firms in market m.11 Then, ∆Competitor CashF low fromOtherMarketsi,m,t
is instruments by
∑




11See Section 1.3.3 for more details.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Effect of Competitors’ Cash Flow Changes on a Firm’s Expansion
Decisions
2.4.1.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions
The first three columns in Table 2.4 present the results from estimating
the specification in Eq. (2.3.1) using the expansion decision of a firm in a given
market when it is faced with a decline in competitors’ cash flows generated from the
other markets during the financial crisis. I estimate the model separately for the
expansion decisions of for all firms in the group (first and fourth columns), for those
of private firms (second and fifth columns), and for those of only publicly-traded
firms (third and sixth columns). In the last case, I also control for one year-lagged
firm-level financial characteristics which may affect the firm’s expansion decisions
(e.g., leverage, cash holdings, and Tobin’s Q).
The first column shows that a 10% decrease in the average competitors’ cash
flows generated from outside of a given market is associated with a 1.9% rise in the
probability that the firm expands in that market. The third column illustrates that
this relationship is slightly smaller (1.5%), if I estimate the model by only examining
the expansion decisions of the publicly-traded firms. These results occur because
more of the financial characteristics of firms are controlled for publicly-traded firms.
These estimates support the hypothesis that firms behave more aggressively in a
market in which they compete with cash flow constrained competitors.
A private firm’s expansion is not significantly related to competitors’ cash
flow changes while positively related to its own cash flow changes at the 1% signif-
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icance level; a 10% increase in own cash flows generated in other markets gives a
rise to the probability of expansion by 20%. These results occurs, because private
firms have limited access to external financing, which makes them less aggressive in
predatory behavior, and makes their investments more sensitive to internal funds.
The fourth through sixth columns present the results from the regressions
with the same specification in the first three columns for the period after the crisis.12
The positive effect of the competitor’s cash flow decrease on the firm’s expansion does
not hold. This confirms that the financial crisis is a nice laboratory for examining
the effect of competitor’s cash flow changes on the firm’s predatory behavior by
providing unexpected shock to peers’ cash flows. It is also noteworthy to point out
that the effect of the firm’s own cash flow changes on expansion is greater and more
economically significant after the crisis period, indicating that a firm’s expansion
decision is more sensitive to its own cash flows, than that of its competitor.
Consistent with the existing literature, firms’ investment is positively related
to demand changes in a market. Firms tend to expand more in a market with an
increasing population, decreasing unemployment, increasing average income, and
decreasing expenses for house owners, all of which capture an increase in demand.
The effect of real estate values on expansion is mixed. The increase in house prices
is negatively related to the expansion while it is positively related to rent changes.
This may be because the real estate prices affect the firm’s business through both
12The estimation before the crisis can not be conducted due to the data limitation. The ACS
3-year data from the Census are only available from the year of 2007; this is used to calculate the
changes in economic condition during the year of 2008. However, when I conduct the same test
using ACS 1-year data, which is available from the year of 2006, for the expansion decision in the
year of 2007, this relationship does not hold.
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the demand and supply side. The decline in the real estate price may have either
a positive or negative effect on a firms’ operating cost, depending on whether the
firm are owns or leases the stores.
2.4.1.2 Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regressions
Table 2.5 illustrates the results from an instrumental variable approach using
the two stage regressions with the specification presented in Equations (2.3.2) and
in (2.3.1). Panels A and B represent the first-stage and second-stage regression
results, respectively. As in the OLS regressions in Section 2.4.1.1, I run regressions
using the same specification for the period during the crisis (first through third
columns) and after the financial crisis (fourth through sixth columns), and estimate
the model separately for all firms in the group (first and fourth columns), for those
of private firms (second and fifth columns), and for those of only publicly-traded
firms (third and sixth columns). In the estimation for publicly-traded firms, I also
control for one year-lagged firm-level financial characteristics, which may affect the
firm’s expansion decision (e.g., leverage, cash holdings, and Tobin’s Q).
The results are similar to the OLS regressions in Table 2.4. The first col-
umn illustrates that a 10% decline in the average competitors’ cash flows generated
from outside of a given market leads to an economically significant increase in the
probability of a firm’s expansion by 1.9%. This relationship is not economically
significant if I only estimate the model for publicly-traded firms (second column),
implying that private firms tend to react more sensitively to competitor’s cash flow
changes. For the period after the crisis period, the competitor’s cash flow changes
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do not have a significant effect on expansion.
Panel B reports the estimates from the first-stage of the 2SLS estimations.
The excluded instruments are the average changes in population, unemployment,
income, house value, rent, and house owner expenses across all the other markets
in which a competitor is operating. These instruments are relevant to competitor’s
cash flow changes in the other markets with significant first-stage F -statistics, 12.34,
at the 5% level. The first column shows that the decrease in house owner expenses
and the increase in house values, which indicate a higher demand outside of a fo-
cal market, are associated with a rise in competitor’s cash flows generated in those
markets. However, the changes in unemployment in those markets are positively
related to their cash flow changes. This may be due to the potential correlation
between the unemployment changes in the focal markets and that of the other mar-
kets. Indeed, Hansen’s J -tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments
are uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage regression.
2.4.1.3 Market Interdependency
The results in Table 2.5 calls for further investigation of the interdependency
across the local markets. For example, the economical condition in a market can
be correlated with that of neighboring markets. In attempt to address this con-
cern, I conduct a further tests by measuring competitors’ outside cash flows (i.e.,
4Competitor Cash Flow from Other Markets in Table 2.5) in a different way. For
each competitor operating in a given market, I measure its average cash flow changes
generated from outside of that market by excluding the sales information from the
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markets located in the same state with the focal market. Then, I take an average
of those cash flow changes across all competitors in that market.
Table 2.6 reports the results from the OLS (first through third columns)
and 2SLS (fourth through sixth columns). The negative relationship between the
expansion and peer’s cash flow changes holds in the OLS by a smaller magnitude
(-0.154), and the relationship is not economically significant in the 2SLS. These
results occur because many retail store chains tend to be clustered in a few states;
excluding any cash flow changes from the same state minimizes the effect of a cash
flow shock that a firm faces during a crisis.
Another potential source of market interdependency is the market overlap
among firms. If a pair of firms are operating in the same markets, they are more
likely to make decisions that take into account each other’s actions in all the markets
in which they are competing. Thus, if firms are operating in many of the same
markets, their expansion decision in a market can be endogenous with respect to
competitors’ cash flow changes in other markets. This issue is further discussed in
Section 2.8.
2.4.2 Effect of Competitors’ Cash Flow Changes and Leverage on a
Firm’s Expansion Decisions
Table 2.7 presents the estimation results for Eq. (2.3.1) with newly defined
4Competitor Cash Flow from Other Markets following Eq. (2.3.3). The first column
reports the estimates from the OLS regression and the second column presents the
estimates of the 2SLS regression; the results of both the OLS and 2SLS are only for
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publicly-traded firms. The results of the OLS and 2SLS are comparable to that of
the third column in 2.4 and the third column in Table 2.5, respectively.
The coefficient on the leverage-weighted cash flow changes of competitors is
more significant than that of non-leverage-weighted cash flow changes of competitors
in both the OLS and 2SLS regressions.13 In particular, the significance increase is
large in the 2SLS regressions; the impact of a competitor’s cash flow changes on
expansion is significant at the 5% level in 2.7, while it is not economically significant
in 2.5. These results support my prediction that the cash flow decrease of an already
highly-leveraged is more likely to be a victim of predation. This implies that firms
strategically respond to their competitors’ financial constraints, both in the external
financing condition and the internal capital availability.
2.4.3 Effect of Competitors’ Cash Flow Changes and the Competitive
Overlap on a Firm’s Expansion Decisions
Table 2.8 reports the estimation results for Eq. (2.3.1). Now, 4Competitor
Cash Flow from Other Markets is defined as in Eq. (2.3.4). The first three columns
report estimates from the OLS regression and the last three columns present that
of the 2SLS regression. I estimate the model separately for all firms in the group
(first and fourth columns), for those of private firms (second and fifth columns), and
for those of only publicly-traded firms (third and sixth columns). The first three
columns of Table 2.8 are comparable to the first three columns in 2.4; the last three
13Note that the magnitude of the coefficient cannot be compared between the regression with
leverage-weighted cash flows and that of non-leverage-weighted cash flows because the variable units
are different.
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columns can be compared to the first three columns in Table 2.5.
The coefficient on the MMCS-weighted cash flow changes of competitors is
more significant than that of the non-MMCS-weighted cash flow changes of com-
petitors in all four cases: (1) OLS with all firms, (2) OLS with private firms, (3)
OLS with publicly-traded firms, (4) 2SLS with all firms, (5) 2SLS with private firms,
and (6) 2SLS with publicly-traded firms.14 The coefficient on the MMCS-weighted
cash flow changes of competitors in the 2SLS regression with publicly-traded firms is
strongly significant, when compared to the baseline 2SLS regression result in Table
2.5. The formal is significant at the 1% level, while the latter is not economically
significant. These results support the prediction that a firm should behave more
aggressively against a competitor with a negative cash flow shock if it faces that
competitor in many other markets. These findings support my results in Chap-
ter 1 by providing additional evidence that a firm’s predatory behavior against a
financially constrained competitor is positively related to their competitive overlap.
In addition, these findings alleviate the concern of market interdependency,
discussed in Section 2.4.1.3, which may arise from market overlaps among firms.
That is, if firms are operating in many of the same markets, their expansion de-
cision in a market can be endogenous with respect to the competitors’ cash flow
changes in other markets. The approach allows us to directly take into account
the effect of competitive overlap, which is omitted in the baseline specification, on
expansion in association with competitor’s cash flow changes. The stronger effect
14Note that the magnitude of the coefficient cannot be compared between the regression with
MMCS-weighted cash flows and that of non-MMCS-weighted cash flows because of the variable
unit differences.
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of the competitors’ cash flow shortfalls on the expansion when we consider the com-
petitive overlap, gives us some comfort in that, at least the potential endogeneity
problem does work against us in the tests in the previous sections.
2.4.4 Effect of Competitors’ Cash Flow Changes on a Firm’s Retrench-
ment Decisions
In this section, I explore the idea that a positive shock to competitors’ cash
flows induces a firm’s retrenchment in a market in which they compete. The intuition
is that a firm may close stores or exit from a market in order to avoid competition
with a financially-strengthened rival. The retrenchment can be either a reaction
to competitors’ aggressive behavior or a decision in anticipation of competitors’
aggressive behavior.
The empirical specification is similar to Eq. (2.3.1) except that a dependent
variable is Retrenchmenti,m,t which equals to 1 if firm i closes stores in market
m in year t. Table 2.9 illustrates the results from estimating this specification. I
estimate the model separately for the expansion decisions of for all firms in the group
(first and fourth columns), for those of only publicly-traded firms (second and fifth
columns), and for those of only publicly-traded firms (third and sixth columns). In
the last case, I also control for one year-lagged firm-level financial characteristics
which may affect the firm’s expansion decisions (e.g., leverage, cash holdings, and
Tobin’s Q).
The fourth column shows that a 10% increase in the average competitors’
cash flows generated from outside of a given market is associated with a 1.6% rise in
72
the probability that the firm retrench from that market. This relationship is slightly
smaller (1.1%), if I estimate the model by only examining the expansion decisions
of the publicly-traded firms (third column), and the relationship is not significant
for those of private firms. These results confirm that firms strategically respond to
the changes in financial constraints of their competitors.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate how internally generated funds impact product
market competition. More specifically, I investigate the idea that firms compete
aggressively when their competitors face cash flow shortfalls. Testing this idea is
challenging because competitor’s cash flow changes are potentially endogenous with
respect to firm’s behavior. To address this problem, 1) using store location data on
retail store chains operating across many local markets, I investigate firm’s reaction
in a given market when its competitors face cash flow shortfalls outside of that
market, 2) I focus on the 2008-2009 financial crisis period in which retail store
chains were hit by a negative demand shock which was hardly expected in advance,
and 3) I use a shock to local economic conditions which varies across markets and the
different distributions of store location across firms as instruments for the changes
in competitors’ cash flows.
I find that a firm expands more in a given market in which it competes with
rivals facing a more negative cash flow shock in other markets. In addition, I find
that a firm facing tighter external financing constraints during the crisis, due to
its high leverage, is more likely to be a victim of predation. Finally, I illustrate
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the evidence that the impact of a rival’s cash flow shortfalls on a firm’s expansion
decision is stronger when they have a higher degree of competitive overlap; these
results are consistent with the perdition of my model in Chapter 1. To my best
knowledge, this chapter is the first study to provide the evidence that a firm’s cash
flow shortfalls induce an aggressive behavior in rival firms. It contributes to the
literature which find that financially vulnerable firms experience more aggressive
behavior from their competitors by adding new evidence from internal financing
vulnerability.
Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of the limitations that may follow
from the empirical context of this study. Since local markets are interdependent, the
economic condition in the other markets may not be an ideal instrument to capture
the competitor’s cash flow shock in those markets although I attempt to alleviate
this problem in several ways. Research that uses instruments less subject to the
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Table 2.3: Correlations of Local Economic Condition Variables
This table illustrates the correlations among the variables representing the changes in the local economic
conditions. 4Population is calculated as the percentage change in total population, 4Unemployment is
measured as the percentage change in the unemployment rate for population 16 years old, 4Income is
defined as the percentage change in the inflation-adjusted per capital income, 4House Owner Expenses is
measured as the percentage change in median monthly owner expenses over household income, 4House
Value is calculated as the percentage change in house values for all owner-occupied housing units, and
4Rent is the percentage change in median gross rent.
During the crisis (2008-2009)
4Population 4Unemployment 4Income 4House Owner Expenses 4House Value 4Rent
4Population 1
4Unemployment 0.0669 1
4Income -0.0598 -0.4713 1
4House Owner Expenses -0.036 0.0453 -0.2401 1
4House Value 0.0591 -0.2911 0.3455 0.1392 1
4Rent 0.0088 -0.1051 0.1343 -0.0127 0.075 1
After the crisis (2010-2011)
4Population 4Unemployment 4Income 4House Owner Expenses 4House Value 4Rent
4Population 1
4Unemployment -0.0372 1
4Income 0.0257 -0.2697 1
4House Owner Expenses -0.0655 0.3281 -0.4609 1
4House Value 0.0095 0.0776 0.1186 0.1667 1
4Rent 0.0433 -0.1249 0.1528 -0.112 0.0654 1
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Table 2.4: Effect of Competitors’ Cash Flow Changes on a Firm’s Expansion: OLS
Regressions
This table reports the linear regression estimates from Eq. (2.3.1) with a binary dependent variable, where
expansion (=1) or no change (=0). See Table 2.2 for the definitions of 4Competitor Cash Flow from Other
Markets, 4Own Cash Flow from Other Markets, and the variables representing the changes in market
conditions, and see Table 2.1 for the other independent variables. Market Share, Market Dependence, and
Total Sales are one-year lagged when the dependent variable is measured in the even-numbered years and
two-year lagged if the dependent variable is measured in the odd-numbered years, because of data limitations
(See Section 1.4.1 for more details). Leverage, Cash Holdings, and Tobin’s Q are lagged one year, while
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at
10%.
During Crisis Period (2008-2009) After Crisis Period (2010-2011)
4Competitor Cash Flow from Other Markets -0.193∗∗ -0.00830 -0.146∗ 0.0433 0.0188 0.0656
(-2.54) (0.04) (-1.84) (0.89) (0.45) (1.16)
4Own Cash Flow from Other Markets 0.185∗ 2.086∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 2.207∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(1.74) (2.94) (2.19) (4.18) (6.65) (3.93)
4Population 0.302∗∗ 0.742∗∗ 0.250 -0.213∗ -0.333 -0.0453
(2.00) (2.16) (1.25) (-1.83) (-1.58) (-0.34)
4Unemployment -0.133∗∗∗ -0.140∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗
(-3.44) (-1.71) (-2.96) (-4.48) (-2.64) (-3.81)
4Income 0.490∗∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ 0.332 0.817∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗
(3.69) (2.66) (1.51) (4.26) (3.51) (2.71)
4House Owner Expenses -0.0273∗∗∗ -0.0237 -0.0276∗∗∗ -0.0192∗∗ -0.0315∗∗ -0.0172∗∗
(-3.76) (-1.39) (-3.52) (-2.56) (-1.99) (-2.32)
4House Value -0.506∗∗∗ -0.724∗∗∗ -0.417∗∗∗ -0.461∗∗∗ -0.254 -0.497∗∗∗
(-4.49) (-3.33) (-3.46) (-3.79) (-1.45) (-3.28)
4Rent 0.386∗∗ 0.371 0.371∗∗ 0.209 0.350 0.231
(2.43) (1.09) (2.24) (1.20) (1.08) (1.13)
Market Share 0.0240 0.0546 0.00941 0.0443 0.00615 0.0122
(1.07) (1.20) (0.29) (1.51) (0.13) (0.37)
Market Dependence 0.228∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 1.378∗∗∗
(3.04) (4.13) (3.00) (5.06) (6.33) (2.94)
Total Sales 0.0191∗∗ 0.0348∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0434∗∗∗ 0.0695∗∗∗ 0.0626∗∗∗
(2.12) (4.03) (3.31) (4.58) (7.88) (4.33)
Leverage -0.00264 -0.00152
(-0.04) (-0.02)
Cash Holdings 0.0609 -0.0374
(0.40) (-0.26)
Tobin’s Q 0.0211 0.00686
(1.51) (1.23)
Private firms included Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Public firms included Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
N 10535 2180 7103 9891 2095 7191
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Table 2.5: Effect of Competitors’ Cash Flow Changes on a Firm’s Expansion : 2SLS
Regressions
This table reports the two stage least squares regression results for Eq. (2.3.1) with a binary dependent
variable, where expansion (=1) or no change (=0). See Table 2.2 for the definitions of 4Competitor
Cash Flow from Other Markets, 4Own Cash Flow from Other Markets, and the variables representing
the changes in market conditions, and see Table 2.1 for the other independent variables. Market Share,
Market Dependence, and Total Sales are one-year lagged when the dependent variable is measured in the
even-numbered years and two-year lagged if the dependent variable is measured in the odd-numbered years,
because of data limitations (See Section 1.4.1 for more details). Leverage, Cash Holdings, and Tobin’s Q
are lagged one year, while standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***Significant at 1%; **significant
at 5%; *significant at 10%.
A: 1st Stage Regression
Instrumented variable: 4Competitor Cash Flow from Other Markets
During Crisis Period (2008-2009) After Crisis Period (2010-2011)
Excluded variables
4Other Market Population -0.572 -0.563 -1.437 0.595 0.824 0.793
(-0.87) (-1.05) (-1.23) (0.40) (0.68) (0.71)
4Other Market Unemployment 0.192∗∗ 0.205∗ 0.164 -0.574∗ -0.615 -0.597∗∗
(2.18) (1.81) (1.25) (-1.63) (-1.26) (-2.05)
4Other Market Income 0.0520 0.643 0.279 3.123∗∗∗ 5.985∗∗∗ 2.409
(0.12) (1.06) (0.49) (2.66) (5.20) (1.53)
4Other Market House Owner Expenses -0.0610∗ -0.0400 -0.0632 -0.186∗∗∗ -0.102∗ -0.214∗∗∗
(-1.94) (-1.61) (-1.31) (-2.68) (-1.74) (-4.02)
4Other Market House Value 0.485∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗ 0.449∗∗ -0.947 -3.912∗∗∗ 0.0942
(3.94) (2.40) (2.66) (-1.30) (-4.43) (0.11)
4Other Market Rent 0.346 -0.00536 0.169 2.050∗∗ 1.423 1.448
(1.24) (-0.02) (0.45) (2.25) (1.18) (1.38)
Included variables
4Population -0.0484 -0.189∗ -0.0122 -0.114 -0.162 -0.0928
(-1.17) (-1.94) (-0.28) (-1.33) (-0.99) (-1.59)
4Unemployment 0.0212∗∗ 0.0543∗∗ 0.00443 0.0733∗ 0.0713 0.0779∗
(2.15) (2.37) (0.36) (1.80) (0.98) (1.85)
4Income -0.00151 0.0411 0.0247 0.0865 -0.328 0.273
(-0.04) (0.50) (0.52) (0.67) (-1.20) (1.59)
4House Owner Expenses -0.00202 0.00272 -0.00299 0.00721∗ 0.000457 0.00527
(-1.16) (0.62) (-1.18) (1.67) (0.04) (1.19)
4House Value -0.0549 -0.0767 -0.0268 -0.184 0.349 -0.265
(-1.63) (-1.26) (-0.69) (-1.50) (1.35) (-1.55)
4Rent 0.0872∗∗ 0.0693 0.0655 0.167 -0.0753 0.162
(2.41) (1.22) (1.11) (1.28) (-0.22) (1.22)
4Own Cash Flow from Other Markets -0.0889∗∗ 0.0263 -0.116∗∗ -0.125∗ 0.558 -0.145
(-2.48) (0.18) (-2.04) (-1.81) (1.49) (-1.45)
Market Share -0.00928 -0.0216∗∗ -0.00375 0.107∗∗ 0.118 0.111
(-0.86) (-2.41) (-0.19) (2.54) (1.49) (1.55)
Market Dependence -0.0546∗∗ 0.0173 -0.175∗ -0.216∗∗ -0.0523 -0.529
(-2.34) (1.51) (-1.99) (-2.48) (-0.86) (-0.77)
Total Sales -0.00337∗∗ 0.000308 -0.0109∗∗ -0.0149∗ -0.00322 -0.0327
(-2.49) (0.14) (-2.11) (-1.81) (-0.36) (-1.29)
Leverage -0.00169 0.00443
(-0.05) (0.06)
Cash Holdings 0.113∗∗ -0.0189
(2.70) (-0.09)
Tobin’s Q -0.00234 -0.0151
(-1.42) (-1.43)
Private firms included Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Public firms included Yes No Yes Yes No Yes




B: 2nd Stage Regression
During Crisis Period (2008-2009) After Crisis Period (2010-2011)
4Competitor Cash Flow from Other Markets -0.191∗∗∗ -0.141 -0.099 0.082 0.029 0.086
(-2.99) (-1.43) (-1.45) (1.01) (0.55) (1.55)
4Own Cash Flow from Other Markets 0.0366 2.108∗∗∗ 0.117 0.305∗∗∗ 1.805∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.30) (2.83) (0.75) (3.65) (3.59) (3.31)
4Population 0.195 0.433 0.226 0.0239 -0.272 0.180
(1.22) (1.13) (1.13) (0.19) (-1.25) (1.45)
4Unemployment -0.0888∗∗ -0.0508 -0.128∗∗ -0.111∗∗ -0.152∗∗ -0.118∗
(-2.30) (-0.49) (-2.39) (-2.18) (-2.14) (-1.70)
4Income 0.523∗∗∗ 1.103∗∗∗ 0.378∗ 0.291 0.855∗∗∗ -0.0412
(3.24) (2.66) (1.76) (1.35) (2.85) (-0.17)
4House Owner Expenses -0.0326∗∗∗ -0.0226 -0.0312∗∗∗ 0.00340 -0.0215 0.00650
(-4.31) (-1.23) (-3.82) (0.47) (-1.32) (1.08)
4House Value -0.535∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗ -0.0103 -0.0405 -0.0889
(-4.61) (-3.15) (-3.46) (-0.06) (-0.21) (-0.39)
4Rent 0.489∗∗ 0.442 0.411∗∗∗ -0.200 0.232 -0.127
(2.54) (1.23) (2.92) (-0.92) (0.63) (-0.70)
Market Share 0.00610 0.0197 -0.00405 -0.0243 -0.0370 -0.0656
(0.20) (0.42) (-0.09) (-0.61) (-0.65) (-1.26)
Market Dependence 0.197∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 2.104∗∗∗
(2.32) (4.60) (2.46) (6.19) (5.95) (2.66)
Total Sales 0.0148 0.0377∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0524∗∗∗ 0.0710∗∗∗ 0.0870∗∗∗
(1.60) (3.99) (3.22) (5.82) (7.28) (4.11)
Leverage -0.00593 -0.00262
(-0.07) (-0.02)
Cash Holdings 0.153 -0.000167
(0.91) (-0.00)
Tobin’s Q 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗
(3.94) (2.30)
Private firms included Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Public firms included Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
N 10535 2180 7103 9891 2095 7191
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Table 2.6: Effect of Competitors’ Cash Flow Changes on a Firm’s Expansion Deci-
sions Excluding Neighboring Markets’ Effect During the Crisis
This table reports the OLS estimates and the 2SLS estimates from Eq. (2.3.1) with a binary dependent vari-
able, where expansion (=1) or no change (=0). 4Competitor Cash Flow from Other Markets is calculated
in two steps: 1) for each competitor operating in a given market, its average cash flow changes generated
from outside of that market are calculated by excluding the sales information from the markets located
in the same state with the focal market, and then 2) it is averaged across all competitors in that market.
4Own Cash Flow from Other Markets is defined in a given market as the percentage change in a firm’s cash
flows generated from all of the other markets excluding the markets which are in the same states with the
focal market. See Table 2.2 for the definitions of the variables representing the changes in market conditions
and Table 2.1 for the other independent variables. Market Share, Market Dependence, and Total Sales are
one-year lagged when the dependent variable is measured in the even-numbered years and two-year lagged
if the dependent variable is measured in the odd-numbered years, because of data limitations (See Section
1.4.1 for more details). Leverage, Cash Holdings, and Tobin’s Q are lagged one year, while standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
A: OLS and 2SLS in the second stage regression
OLS 2SLS (2nd Stage)
4Competitor Cash Flow from Other Markets -0.154∗∗ 0.0253 -0.102 -0.139 -0.359∗∗ -0.143
(-2.34) (0.16) (-1.35) (-1.07) (-2.26) (-0.98)
4Own Cash Flow from Other Markets 0.169 1.322∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.0478 1.598∗ 0.0271
(1.60) (1.73) (2.15) (0.33) (1.68) (0.12)
4Population 0.300∗∗ 0.782∗∗ 0.244 0.137 -0.107 0.156
(1.98) (2.24) (1.22) (0.82) (-0.23) (0.68)
4Unemployment -0.133∗∗∗ -0.137 -0.132∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ 0.0704 -0.138∗∗
(-3.39) (-1.65) (-2.94) (-3.16) (0.50) (-2.37)
4Income 0.487∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗ 0.333 0.450∗∗∗ 1.274∗∗ 0.399∗
(3.64) (2.66) (1.51) (3.08) (2.29) (1.93)
4House Owner Expenses -0.0275∗∗∗ -0.0251 -0.0280∗∗∗ -0.0297∗∗∗ -0.0108 -0.0331∗∗∗
(-3.83) (-1.42) (-3.57) (-4.19) (-0.38) (-3.90)
4House Value -0.507∗∗∗ -0.762∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -0.518∗∗∗ -0.856∗∗ -0.400∗∗∗
(-4.46) (-3.12) (-3.49) (-4.31) (-2.33) (-3.27)
4Rent 0.384∗∗ 0.384 0.377∗∗ 0.451∗∗ 0.320 0.415∗∗
(2.43) (1.13) (2.27) (2.34) (0.69) (2.53)
Market Share 0.0252 0.0511 0.00972 0.0113 -0.0331 -0.00870
(1.13) (1.09) (0.30) (0.44) (-0.52) (-0.19)
Market Dependence 0.227∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗
(2.99) (4.21) (3.00) (2.34) (3.45) (2.26)
Total Sales 0.0186∗∗ 0.0358∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0170∗ 0.0491∗∗∗ 0.0263∗∗∗
(2.05) (3.96) (3.30) (1.77) (2.90) (2.97)
Leverage 0.00192 -0.0122
(0.03) (-0.12)
Cash Holdings 0.0586 0.246
(0.38) (0.91)
Tobin’s Q 0.0217 0.0189∗∗∗
(1.55) (3.95)
Private firms included Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Public firms included Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
N 9979 2178 7072 9979 2178 7072
B: 2SLS in the first stage regression (Excluded variables)
4Other Market Population -0.190 -0.0291 -1.041 4Other Market House Owner Expenses -0.0662∗∗ -0.0451∗∗ -0.0804
(-0.33) (-0.06) (-1.46) (-2.00) (-2.05) (-1.43)
4Other Market Unemployment 0.115∗ 0.107 0.138 4Other Market House Value 0.329∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗ 0.388∗
(1.91) (1.63) (1.67) (3.09) (2.17) (2.01)
4Other Market Income 0.147 0.148 0.232 4Other Market Rent -0.400∗ -0.300 -0.392
(0.36) (0.33) (0.42) (-1.91) (-1.30) (-1.50)
Private firms included Yes Yes No Private firm included Yes Yes No
Public firms included Yes No Yes Public firms included Yes No Yes
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Table 2.7: Effect of Competitors’ Leverage-Weighted Cash Flow Changes on a Firm’s
Expansion During the Crisis
This table reports the OLS estimates and the 2SLS estimates from Eq. (2.3.1) with a binary dependent
variable, where expansion (=1) or no change (=0). 4Competitor Cash Flow from Other Markets is the
competitors’ weighted cash flows generated from other markets, which provides more weights to the decrease
in a highly-leveraged competitor’s cash flows, using a competitor’s leverage before the crisis. See Eq. (2.3.3)
for more details. See Table2.2 for the definition of 4Own Cash Flow and the variables representing the
changes in market conditions, and see Table 2.1 for the other independent variables. Market Share, Market
Dependence, and Total Sales are one-year lagged when the dependent variable is measured in the even-
numbered years and two-year lagged if the dependent variable is measured in the odd-numbered years,
because of data limitations (See Section 1.4.1 for more details). Leverage, Cash Holdings, and Tobin’s Q
are lagged one year, while standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***Significant at 1%; **significant
at 5%; *significant at 10%.
A: OLS and 2SLS in the second stage regression
OLS 2SLS
4Competitor Cash Flow from Other Markets -0.407∗∗ -0.229∗∗
(-2.62) (-2.42)








4House Owner Expenses -0.0277∗∗∗ -0.0299∗∗∗
(-3.54) (-3.40)




Market Share 0.00824 0.0113
(0.25) (0.26)
Market Dependence 0.494∗∗∗ 0.623∗
(2.94) (1.69)




Cash Holdings 0.0759 0.200
(0.49) (1.12)
Tobin’s Q 0.0216 0.0160∗∗∗
(1.55) (3.82)
N 7103 7103
B: 2SLS in the first stage regression (Excluded variables only)
4Other Market Population -0.704 4Other Market House Owner Expenses -0.0134
(-1.60) (-0.77)
4Other Market Unemployment -0.0945∗∗ 4Other Market House Value 0.512∗∗∗
(-2.33) (3.83)
4Other Market Income -0.395 4Other Market Rent 0.143
(-1.56) (0.74)
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Table 2.8: Effect of Competitors’ MMCS-Weighted Cash Flow Changes on a Firm’s
Expansion During the Crisis
This table reports the OLS estimates and the 2SLS estimates from Eq. (2.3.1) with a binary dependent
variable, expansion (=1) or no change (=0). 4Competitor Cash Flow is the competitors’ weighted cash
flows, constructed giving more weights to the decrease in a high-MMCS competitor’s cash flows. See Eq.
(2.3.4) for more details. See Table 2.2 for the definition of 4Own Cash Flow, and variables for the changes
in market conditions, and see Table 2.1 for the definition of MMCS , and the other independent variables.
Market Share, Market Dependence, and Total Sales are one-year lagged when the dependent variable is
measured in the even-numbered years and two-year lagged if the dependent variable is measured in the odd-
numbered years, because of data limitations (See Section 1.4.1 for more details). Leverage, Cash Holdings,
and Tobin’s Q are lagged one year, while standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***Significant at
1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
A: OLS and 2SLS in the second stage regression
OLS 2SLS (2nd Stage)
4Competitor Cash Flow from Other Markets -0.989∗∗∗ -0.0576 -1.150∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗
(-4.08) (-0.26) (-2.41) (-4.43) (-3.02) (-3.13)
4Own Cash Flow from Other Markets 0.187∗ 2.052∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗ 0.142 2.046∗∗∗ 0.104
(1.86) (2.91) (2.08) (1.51) (2.86) (0.93)
4Population 0.276∗ 0.684∗∗ 0.241 0.225 0.557∗ 0.207
(1.94) (2.06) (1.24) (1.62) (1.74) (1.10)
4Unemployment -0.132∗∗∗ -0.143∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.107 -0.151∗∗
(-3.37) (-1.75) (-2.86) (-2.61) (-1.34) (-2.41)
4Income 0.468∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.317 0.433∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗ 0.316
(3.64) (2.61) (1.50) (2.87) (2.66) (1.53)
4House Owner Expenses -0.0273∗∗∗ -0.0248 -0.0284∗∗∗ -0.0274∗∗∗ -0.0220 -0.0297∗∗∗
(-3.90) (-1.52) (-3.77) (-3.90) (-1.29) (-3.71)
4House Value -0.460∗∗∗ -0.692∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.514∗∗ -0.304∗∗
(-4.31) (-3.17) (-3.23) (-3.57) (-2.35) (-2.56)
4Rent 0.391∗∗ 0.364 0.384∗∗ 0.409∗∗ 0.390 0.377∗∗∗
(2.51) (1.06) (2.44) (2.56) (1.11) (3.21)
Market Share 0.0317 0.0460 0.0150 0.0943∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.0652∗
(1.43) (1.04) (0.51) (3.27) (2.10) (1.92)
Market Dependence 0.198∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.0341 0.187∗∗∗ 0.368
(2.63) (4.06) (2.79) (0.34) (3.33) (1.30)
Total Sales 0.0212∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗ 0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0278∗
(2.29) (4.12) (3.08) (2.45) (3.93) (1.68)
Leverage -0.00835 -0.0332
(-0.11) (-0.31)
Cash Holdings 0.105 0.262∗
(0.71) (1.78)
Tobin’s Q 0.0185 0.0118∗∗
(1.32) (2.10)
Private firms included Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Public firms included Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
N 10535 2180 7103 10535 2180 7103
B: 2SLS in the first stage regression (Excluded variables)
4Other Market Population -2.797 -1.790 -3.854 4Other Market House Owner Expenses -0.365∗∗∗ -0.0789 -0.529∗∗
(-1.31) (-1.56) (-1.38) (-4.08) (-0.90) (-2.32)
4Other Market Unemployment 0.110 0.262 -0.311 4Other Market House Value 1.452∗∗∗ 0.491 2.477∗
(0.61) (1.39) (-0.51) (3.15) (1.19) (2.01)
4Other Market Income -3.667 3.094 -10.28 4Other Market Rent -0.745 -3.440∗∗∗ 3.096
(-1.60) (1.35) (-1.34) (-0.59) (-2.75) (0.68)
Private firms included Yes Yes No Private firm included Yes Yes No
Public firms included Yes No Yes Public firms included Yes No Yes
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Table 2.9: Effect of Competitors’ Cash Flow Changes on a Firm’s Retrenchment
Decisions
This table reports the results from OLS regressions and the 2SLS regressions with a binary dependent
variable, where retrenchment (=1) or no change (=0). See Table 2.2 for the definitions of 4Competitor
Cash Flow from Other Markets, 4Own Cash Flow from Other Markets, and the variables representing
the changes in market conditions, and see Table 2.1 for the other independent variables. Market Share,
Market Dependence, and Total Sales are one-year lagged when the dependent variable is measured in the
even-numbered years and two-year lagged if the dependent variable is measured in the odd-numbered years,
because of data limitations (See Section 1.4.1 for more details). Leverage, Cash Holdings, and Tobin’s Q
are lagged one year, while standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***Significant at 1%; **significant
at 5%; *significant at 10%.
A: OLS and 2SLS in the second stage regression
OLS 2SLS (2nd Stage)
4Competitor Cash Flow from Other Markets -0.0394 0.0948 -0.0293 0.155∗∗∗ 0.055 0.107∗
(-0.57) (0.65) (-0.43) (3.06) (0.41) (1.77)
4Own Cash Flow from Other Markets -0.156 0.421 -0.276∗ -0.0149 0.394 -0.149
(-1.08) (0.51) (-1.84) (-0.09) (0.48) (-0.82)
4Population -0.478∗∗∗ -0.691 -0.521∗∗ -0.365∗∗ -0.585 -0.453∗∗
(-2.88) (-1.29) (-2.58) (-2.11) (-0.93) (-2.31)
4Unemployment 0.405∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗
(7.86) (3.08) (5.75) (6.29) (2.13) (5.38)
4Income -1.244∗∗∗ -0.651 -1.099∗∗∗ -1.264∗∗∗ -0.662 -1.156∗∗∗
(-4.47) (-1.44) (-3.25) (-4.35) (-1.47) (-3.36)
4House Owner Expenses 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗ 0.0103 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0337∗∗ 0.0143
(2.96) (2.21) (1.36) (3.26) (2.06) (1.61)
4House Value 0.569∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(2.96) (1.99) (2.73) (3.03) (2.03) (3.06)
4Rent -1.090∗∗∗ -0.944∗∗∗ -0.855∗∗∗ -1.179∗∗∗ -0.960∗∗∗ -0.904∗∗∗
(-4.94) (-3.39) (-4.28) (-4.95) (-3.38) (-4.50)
Market Share 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0200 0.0564 0.122∗∗∗ 0.0259 0.0506
(2.90) (0.35) (1.42) (3.22) (0.43) (1.43)
Market Dependence 0.299∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 1.306∗∗
(2.16) (4.19) (2.05) (2.80) (3.73) (2.46)
Total Sales 0.0233 0.0290∗∗∗ -0.00141 0.0298∗ 0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0149
(1.38) (3.81) (-0.12) (1.72) (3.83) (0.88)
Leverage 0.135 0.125
(1.48) (1.32)
Cash Holdings -0.0542 -0.192
(-0.42) (-1.13)
Tobin’s Q 0.0148 0.0162∗∗∗
(1.46) (3.56)
Private firms included Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Public firms included Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
N 10510 2158 7100 10510 2158 7100
B: 2SLS in the first stage regression (Excluded variables)
4Other Market Population -0.570 -0.551 -1.435∗∗ 4Other Market House Owner Expenses -0.0608∗ -0.0390 -0.0631
(-0.87) (-1.02) (-2.23) (-1.93) (-1.57) (-1.31)
4Other Market Unemployment 0.192∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 4Other Market House Value 0.483∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗ 0.449∗∗
(2.17) (1.79) (1.25) (3.93) (2.33) (2.66)
4Other Market Income 0.0575 0.671 0.279 4Other Market Rent 0.341 -0.0410 0.171
(0.14) (1.10) (0.48) (1.22) (-0.13) (0.46)
Private firms included Yes Yes No Private firm included Yes Yes No
Public firms included Yes No Yes Public firms included Yes No Yes
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